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
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THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY
SINCE 1947

David J. Potter, Major, USAF
Gregory J. Stachelczyk, Lt., USN

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
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The United States and Turkey have had a joint military relationship since 1947. However, there has been a growing concern over this relationship since the mid-1960's. This concern increased during the Cyprus conflict of 1974, and the subsequent U.S. embargo on arms shipments to Turkey. This thesis explores the relationship from development to the present, including the reasons why the relationship developed, how it grew, the problems that have been encountered, and how each nation has modified its part of the relationship. In spite of the trying situations which have occurred, the research indicates that the military relationship has been and will remain strong. Although the Turkish nation will strive to become less dependent on U.S. arms, through domestic production and purchases from other nations, the close working relations between the military forces will continue for the foreseeable future.

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THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND TURKEY SINCE 1947

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
Of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degrees of Master of Science in Acquisition Logistics Management
and Master of Science in Logistics Management

By

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June 1981

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This thesis, written by

Major David J. Potter

and

Lieutenant Gregory J. Stachelczyk

has been accepted by the undersigned on behalf of the faculty
of the School of Systems and Logistics in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degrees of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ACQUISITION LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
(Major David J. Potter)

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
(Lieutenant Gregory J. Stachelczyk)

DATE: 17 June 1981

Leslie M. Norton
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Since the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 (1:9), there has been a close military relationship between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey. This relationship has evolved from the vital geographical proximity of Turkey to the Soviet Union, to the vital oilfields in the Middle East, and to the nations of Western Europe.

Problem Statement

A comprehensive account of the United States military assistance to Turkey that has resulted from international treaties and official agreements does not currently exist. Several studies have been performed on various periods of time, but there has been no effort as of yet to consolidate this information into one source.

Justification

Through the Dardenelles and the Bosphorus, which are connected by the Sea of Marmara, Turkey monitors and controls passage between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. This passage will be referred to as the Straits throughout this paper. In case of hostilities, the control of the Straits would allow Turkey to deny the Soviets access to the Mediterranean Sea.

As Turkey is the only nation between Europe and the sources of much of the Arab oil, it provides a strategic communication and transportation link from sources of this increasingly important commodity to its users. Additionally, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Turkey provides (along with Greece) the first line of defense for NATO's southern flank (48:2).

In spite of these strong military relationships, the military ties between the U.S. and Turkey were severely tested in the 1960's and 1970's. Several events occurred which began to cause the Turkish Government to "rethink" its relationship with the U.S. (48:5). The most significant of these incidents were the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the subsequent arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the U.S. Congress (11:21). While the embargo has since been lifted, many questions still remain concerning the ramifications that these actions have had on the military relationship between the two nations. Given Turkey's strategic geographical location, its membership in NATO, its nearness to vital energy sources, and its increasing importance in the modern world, it can be seen that there is a need for the compilation of a continuous and complete narrative concerning the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Literature Review

A search for literature related to this area of concern was made through the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange and the Defense Technical Information Center. In each

case, several studies applied to U.S. military assistance to Turkey. However, very few covered the period of time after the imposition of the U.S. arms embargo, and none of the documents covered the military relationship with Turkey after 1978, when the embargo was lifted.

A literature search was also made of the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management and at Wright State University. At these locations, factual documents such as The Congressional Record, the U.S. Statutes at Large, the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, the New York Times, etc. were reviewed for information. Additionally, numerous current periodical articles, and other sources which dealt primarily with the history of our military relationship were reviewed.

Research Objectives

Many changes have occurred in the military relationship between the United States and Turkey since its inception in 1947. Educators, planners, and policy-makers must have a thorough understanding of what events have affected the U.S. military relationship with Turkey, and the effect that this relationship has on the military establishment of the Republic of Turkey. This research brings together in one document the pertinent, unclassified data concerning the U.S. military relationship with Turkey, and analyzes these data to determine trends that appear to be evident at this time.

Scope and Limitations

The period of time and the events covered in this research ranged from the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to March 1981. As the substantiating and background information predominantly reports the U.S. viewpoint, this research is structured in that manner, and reports the Turkish perspective of an agreement/incident only when it has a direct and significant impact on the inter-country relationship.

The information for this research is presented in an historical manner. No judgmental evaluations are made in the research as to the course of the U.S. policy in Turkey, and no classified information is presented.

The research is limited to assimilating the relevant information on U.S. military aid to the Republic of Turkey, and does not cover all aspects of the U.S.-Turkey relationships, in particular the economic and political.

Research Questions

The overall question which this research proposes to answer is: What is the current military relationship between the United States and Turkey? While answering this overall question, several supplementary questions will also be answered. These questions are:

1. What factors cause Turkey to be of military importance to the United States?
2. How has the United States Security Assistance Program affected Turkey's defense needs?

3. What factors/events over time have affected the military relationship between the United States and Turkey?
4. What are the pivotal issues today that will determine the future of this military relationship?

Procedures

For this research, the term "military relationship" refers to any major bilateral or multilateral international treaty or security assistance agreement between the U.S. and Turkey. Examples of the bilateral and multilateral agreements between the nations are the base rights agreements and the NATO charter, respectively. The term military relationship also includes any major unilateral policy made by one country which affects the other. This type of policy is best exemplified by the U.S. Arms Embargo of 1974 and the Turkish Government's closure of U.S. military facilities in 1975.

The information necessary to answer the research questions was available from two general sources. The first source was documentary evidence: The Congressional Record, the U.S. Statutes at Large, etc. provide factual data concerning the terms and conditions of various international agreements between Turkey and the U.S. The Congressional Presentation Documents, the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts, and other documents available at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provide a

record of security assistance given to Turkey, whether it was through military sales or military assistance programs. Additional information available at DISAM included copies of various international agreements which provide the text of the formal military relationship. Copies of base rights agreements were available from those individuals who dealt directly with the Turkish affairs at both the Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) country desks. Each of these sources were used to identify other government documents which contributed to this research. Additional information was available from the New York Times and other current literature.

Personal interviews provided significant reliable data from those personnel of the Departments of Defense and State who dealt directly in this relationship. These sources include: the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy; the Office of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Europe/Africa Division of DSAA; and the DSAA Comptroller Office. Also, interviews were held at the Department of State's Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Southeastern European Affairs. Other pertinent sources of information that were identified during these interviews were investigated. The Turkish Army Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, was interviewed to provide a Turkish perspective on the relationship.

Plan of Presentation

Chapter I, Introduction: This chapter presents the problem statement, the justification of this research, and a brief review of current data and their sources. It also provides the objective of this research, establishes the research's scope and limitations of the research questions, and describes the procedures employed to answer these questions.

Chapter II summarizes the events in the U.S.-Turkey relationship from 1947 to 1963.

Chapter III summarizes the events in the relationship from 1964 to 1973.

Chapter IV summarizes the events in the relationship from 1974 to 1978.

Chapter V summarizes the events in the relationship from 1979 to the present and relates the data to the previous periods of the relationship.

Chapter VI answers the research questions and identifies areas which the authors believe offer fruitful fields for future research.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING, 1947-1963

Initial Assistance

According to several sources, "The Truman Doctrine signified the formal emergence of the United States as Turkey's chief support in the West [4:25]." This desired support of the West was a result of several factors. First was the constant threat of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) to gain control of the Straits which was denied to them by the Montreux Convention of 1936 (50:9). In addition was the desire of the Turkish Republic to gain wealthy and powerful allies to assist in building Turkey's economic and military structure. Thus, with these constraints and in "reaction to Communist activities in Greece and the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from the area [51:40]," the United States was to become increasingly interested in that region of the world.

In announcing his doctrine to a Joint Session of the House and Senate on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman said:

One of the primary objectives of the Foreign Policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.

I believe that it must be the Foreign Policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside

pressures.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished [32:1980-1981].

The President, in effect, stated to the world the end of our "benevolent neutrality toward the spread of Soviet power in the world [3:235-236]." In support of the Doctrine and after lengthy Congressional debate, an aid agreement was approved by both the U.S. House and Senate (93:1) and signed by President Truman on May 22, 1947 (20:103-105). This agreement was referred to the Turks and was signed in Ankara on July 12, 1947 (see Appendix A). This agreement provided Turkey \$152.5 million as military assistance (5:5).

In June 1947 the Marshall Plan, designed to provide economic assistance in rebuilding Europe, was announced. Turkey, although a participant in the Plan, did not suffer the physical destruction felt by the rest of Europe. Consequently, it was not originally scheduled to play a major role in receiving financial support. However, due to its position as an outpost of the West against the U.S.S.R., Ankara pointed to its heavy defense burden as justification for assistance. Under the shadow of this argument, in March 1948 the U.S. decided to extend \$10 million in credits to Turkey (4:31-32). This was put into law upon the signing of the Economic Cooperation Act on April 3, 1948 (21:137-158). As a follow-on to these agreements, a U.S.-Turkey Mutual Defense Assistance Act was signed on October 6, 1949 (22:714-721).

Turkey in NATO

The treaty that united the U.S. and eleven other nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was signed in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949 (12:244) (Appendix B). Because it was not geographically located in the immediate Atlantic area, Turkey was not invited to become a charter member of the organization. This fact was not viewed with pleasure by the Turkish Government, for it was felt that its not being a member of NATO could cause a reduction in the amount of aid that would be received from the U.S. (4:35).

The Korean War provided Turkey its opportunity to join the organization. Turkey had joined the United Nations (UN) on August 15, 1945 (12:43); on June 27, 1950 the UN Security Council invited the organization's members to repel the armed attack against the Republic of Korea, which was aided and abetted by the Soviet Union. In response to this request, the Turkish Government offered to send a mixed brigade of 4,500 men to the conflict. This unit was the third largest to participate in this action, after the American and South Korean forces. As a result of their distinguished actions, the Turks were highly praised by the other forces (18:37).

To make use of the advantage that the actions of their troops had given them, the Turkish Government made a formal request to join NATO on August 1, 1950. The NATO foreign ministers, not wishing at that time to openly antagonize the Soviets by accepting members at their very border,

decided upon a compromise alternative. Turkey, along with Greece, who had previously requested membership, were not offered full membership status, but were invited to join in the planning of the NATO military strategy for the Mediterranean area. Both nations accepted this proposal, and in October 1950 became "partial" members of NATO. The following September, both the U.S. and Britain proposed that they be allowed to become full members. This proposal was accepted by the organization, and on February 18, 1952, Turkey and Greece became full members of NATO (4:41-44) (Appendix C).

Continuing Assistance

From the initial support begun by the Truman Doctrine, the aid and assistance provided to Turkey by the U.S. continued to grow and was seen to be beneficial to both parties. Each following year, requests for aid were drafted and approved by the U.S. Congress and the President. For example, \$25 million in a Mutual Support Agreement grant was authorized by President Truman on February 6, 1952 (68:1).

In 1954 two major bilateral agreements were approved and signed by representatives of Turkey and the U.S. The first was the Status of Forces Agreement in June, which provided privileges and immunities for nondiplomatic personnel in the service of the U.S. Government (42:1465-1475). The second, also completed in June, was the Military Facilities Agreement. Like many of the agreements, this was a secret accord that had been concluded with the Turkish Cabinet and

was not ratified by the Turkish Parliament (4:54).

Pact of Baghdad/CENTO

In 1953 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles laid the groundwork for a new defense arrangement for the Middle East sector of the globe. It was to be an alliance of nations of the area, specifically Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. After lengthy negotiations between the nations, the Pact of Baghdad was signed on February 24, 1955 (12:254). This pact was to include Great Britain, which had previously completed a Treaty of Alliance with Iraq in 1930 (18:281). The U.S., although not a signatory, became a member of several important committees (military, counter-subversion, and economic), and later made individual bilateral defense agreements with the members of the Pact (12:254). This Pact, in effect, extended the defense lines of NATO to include the borders of three new countries (Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan) (53:27). Turkey's importance to the West and threat to the U.S.S.R. was greatly increased, for as a member of both the Baghdad Pact and NATO, it was to be the "link between the two Alliances [12:254]."

The Pact of Baghdad, as originally formed, was short-lived. In July 1958, the ruling family of Iraq was overthrown. The new Iraqi Government labeled the Pact as "Imperialist," and later formally withdrew. On March 5, 1959 the Pact was to be replaced by the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (53:27). The U.S., not being a member of CENTO, signed bilateral defense agreements with the CENTO nations on that same

day to strengthen their mutual military position (92:6).

The Crisis in Lebanon

On January 5, 1957, in a special address to Congress, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated:

The Middle East has abruptly reached a new and critical stage in its long and important history....

The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle East is solely that of power politics. Considering her announced purpose of communizing the world, it is easy to understand her hope of soon dominating the Middle East.

The proposed legislation is primarily designed to deal with the possibility of Communist aggression, direct and indirect [33:224-227].

In his speech, the President requested that Congress authorize a program for economic and military assistance. This assistance was to include the use of U.S. military forces in the support of countries included in this program. The program, as voted on by a Joint Resolution of Congress on March 9, 1957 (23:5-6), originally known as the Resolution of the Middle East, is commonly called the "Eisenhower Doctrine." At the outset, only the nations of Lebanon and Iraq formally accepted this aid.

During the spring of 1958, strife inside Lebanon brought the ruling government closer and closer to being overthrown in a revolutionary uprising. After receiving little or no effective assistance from the UN or the Council of the Arab League, the Lebanese Government, as required under the Eisenhower Doctrine, sent a request to the U.S. for aid to help end the crisis (18:284). Washington approved the request and sent forces from units in Europe and the Sixth Fleet in

mid-July 1958. Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey, was used as a staging point for these forces.

This action was to place a strain upon the sturdy U.S.-Turkey relationship. Due to the need for haste in preparation of the force deployment, the Turkish authorities were not able to be consulted on the action; they were notified after the fact of what had occurred. This was viewed in some sectors as a violation of Turkish sovereignty since the forces had been ordered into the area not on the orders of Ankara, but on those of Washington. From this situation arose the question:

Was the alliance to be a coincidence of interests of the broad scope that Ankara had sought up to that time--and which the United States had agreed it should be--or was the cooperation limited primarily to matters directly involving the USSR [4:67]?

Another aspect of the ramifications of using the Incirlik Air Base was the damage that was done to U.S. relations with the Turkish press. As the U.S. troops were flown to the air base, they were accompanied by members of the American and European press corps. These journalists received relatively free access to the facility. Because the base was home for the highly classified U-2 reconnaissance aircraft stationed in Turkey, security and control were otherwise extremely tight. Turkish reporters, on the other hand, did not fare so well. As they drove to the installation, they were stopped and refused entrance by the Turkish perimeter security guards. These guards did not receive authorization to permit the Turkish reporters on the base until after the

activity had calmed down. Any information that was received and printed in any of the Turkish papers had to be received second-hand from American or European sources (4:67). Both of these situations undermined pro-American feelings and reinforced the belief of some Turks that a road of less dependence on the U.S. should be sought.

The Lebanese conflict was the only time that the Eisenhower Doctrine was employed. As mentioned previously, the U.S. and Turkey, along with Iran and Pakistan, were to sign bilateral assistance agreements on March 5, 1959. The agreement between the U.S. and Turkey was to be simply called "Cooperation." A major statement within the parameter of this agreement concerned "the determination of the parties 'to resist aggression, direct or indirect' [43:320]." This phrase, due to internal political problems and violence, was to be given great importance by the Turkish Government during the next year. It had been feared that the ruling government would request, under auspices of the poorly defined "indirect" phrase, U.S. troops to stifle and put down any political opposition to its party and policies (4:68-69).

The Military Takes Over

On May 27, 1960, in an attempt to restore democracy and "to eliminate the repression of various social, economic and internal political factors [51:58]," a military junta overthrew the existing government of Turkey. This revolution, "American leaders were pleased to know, was directed against

neither NATO nor the United States [18:127]." As the junta had

. . . inherited an almost empty treasury, [it] took steps the day after the takeover to ensure the U.S. of continued Turkish support and commitment to NATO [55:22].

The government was returned to civilian control in October 1961, when various political parties participated in open parliamentary elections.

Cuban Missile Crisis

In October 1962 the world was (as it was thought then) poised on the brink of destruction. This perilous situation was caused by the Cuban missile crisis between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Turkey, not directly involved in the crisis, was drawn into it by one of its NATO commitments. In 1957, a decision had been made by the NATO ministers to deploy medium-range, atomic warheaded missiles to the territories of various member nations. Only Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey accepted this responsibility. The actual installation of these missiles began in Turkey in 1959, and was completed in July 1962, when the missiles were considered to be operational. These missiles, the "Jupiter" class, were already considered to be obsolete by the time their installation in Turkey was completed.

In April 1961, President John F. Kennedy had requested that the State Department negotiate with the Turkish Government to have these missiles removed. The reason for this request was that, as stated, the missiles themselves were considered

obsolete, and their basic mission of deterrence against the U.S.S.R. would be better served by the Polaris missile submarines that were then available. However, because of the Turkish Government's reluctance to have their defenses reduced by the missile removal, they were still in place when the Cuban missile crisis began (4:90-92).

In the first of two letters sent to President Kennedy on October 26, Soviet Premier Khrushchev admitted the presence of the missiles in Cuba. He promised they would be removed in exchange for guarantees that the U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba would be lifted, and that U.S. forces would not invade the island. The second letter equated the missiles in Cuba to those in Turkey, and stated that the Cuban missiles would be removed in exchange for removal of the Turkish missiles.

In his reply to Premier Khrushchev on October 27, President Kennedy ignored the second message. In accepting the course of action stated in the first letter, he ended the Cuban missile crisis.

The Turkish missiles were eventually removed in early 1963. The action of removing the missiles was to cause trouble in the Turkish-American relationship, for it appeared that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had made some sort of secret deal that directly affected the security and defense of the Turkish nation without their (Turkey's) being made a part of it (18:128-129).

This factor of apparent "unilateral decisions" and the strategy of "flexible response" in which the U.S. would

not automatically launch an attack in "massive retaliation" of an attack upon one of its allies caused the Turkish Government and people to begin a reappraisal of its commitments to NATO and its relationship with the U.S. (51:77).

CHAPTER III

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS, 1963-1973

Cyprus 1963

After a long and turbulent period of political and national unrest, the independent Republic of Cyprus had been formed on August 16, 1960. One of the major causes of the unrest was the desire of the island's pro-Greek majority to unite with Greece and not remain a separate entity. This program, which was called "enosis," was in direct opposition to the desire of the island's Turkish minority for "taksim," or partition. The Turkish Cypriots did not, in any manner, wish their island republic to form a union with the Greek nation (12:250-251).

In late 1963, this issue reached the point where the island was split by civil war. The conflict was going badly for the outnumbered Turkish Cypriots, and there was a great fear that they would be overrun by the Greek Cypriot forces. Turkey attempted to put an end to the fighting by appealing to both Greece and Great Britain to intervene (56:26). The three countries (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain) had signed the London-Zurich Accords in 1959 with Cyprus. While granting independence to Cyprus, they forbade partition or union with another country. These Accords, called the Treaty of Guarantee, prescribed certain percentages for majority and minority

participation in the Cypriot Army and Civil Service, and reserved the right for each signing nation to unilaterally defend the treaty's provisions (47:14-15).

After the unsuccessful attempt of Greece and Great Britain to negotiate a cessation of the hostilities, Turkey took it upon herself to uphold the Accord's provisions. To do so, on December 25, 1963, four Turkish aircraft made aerial passes over the beleaguered island, attacking the Greek Cypriot positions (47:16). Turkey also ordered several of its naval units to transit from the port of Istanbul to the port of Mersin on the southwest Turkish coast. This would take the force very close to Cyprus (4:107).

Since the aircraft that were flown on the Cyprus mission had been given to the nation by the U.S. for support of NATO, a controversy arose as to whether they had been used in violation of the U.S. Aid Agreement of 1947. The Agreement had stated that equipment furnished by the U.S. could not be used "for any purpose other than for which the article. . . is furnished" (see Appendix A). The U.S., caught in a position between the two adversaries and not wanting to alienate either Greece or Turkey, did not display a firm stance on the problem.

The next major step of the crisis was made by the United Kingdom. After a December 30th ceasefire agreement was signed, the British provided armed troops to man a neutral zone to separate the combatants. They did not desire to remain the policemen of Cyprus, and called for a conference of the concerned nations to take place in London in January 1964.

This conference led to a unanimous UN resolution to place a peace-keeping force on Cyprus. This force, the United Nation's Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, first arrived on Cyprus on March 14, 1964 (18:254). Even the use of these UN forces did not contain the desire of the Turkish Army to invade the island and aid their Cypriot brothers. Additionally, with current popular sentiment in favor of supporting the Turkish Cypriot cause, the Turkish Government was very concerned with the approaching senatorial elections. In consideration of the Army's desire, and not wishing to affect the elections' outcome by the lack of a positive supportive action, approval to prepare for the invasion of Cyprus was given.

President Lyndon B. Johnson and his advisors were so concerned that ongoing events were bringing the two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) closer to open armed conflict that the President sent a personal letter, drafted by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inönü (49:28-29). This letter (see Appendix D), delivered on June 5, 1964, was to be referred to as the "Johnson Letter," and would resurface time and time again to reflect the Turkish beliefs in the value of the U.S. alliances.

In this letter, President Johnson pointed out to the Turkish Government that its NATO obligations did not allow one NATO country to wage war on another NATO country. Also mentioned was the possibility that the U.S.S.R. could take this opportunity of dissention in the ranks of NATO to become involved in the conflict themselves. Specifically, the letter

stated:

I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies [18:130].

This statement, along with the restriction that "the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present circumstances [18:130]," led to the abandonment of the plan for a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, as requested by the President.

The severity with which President Johnson stated the possible ramifications to the proposed Turkish actions, "shocked the Turks deeply, and brought into question the entire basis of their relationship with NATO and particularly with the United States [48:5]." In a letter of reply dated June 14, 1964 (see Appendix E), Prime Minister Inönü, while stating that "We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee [18:131]," voiced his strong objections to the possible alternative of not being provided assistance in the case of aggressive action by the U.S.S.R. Basically, the U.S. reaction to the Turkish preparations gave the Turkish Government "the impression that there exists between us a wide divergence of the views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance [18:131]." The relationship which had been born with the Truman Doctrine,

and had grown from that time, was never again to be based on as much trust and so strong a foundation as before the Cyprus Crisis of 1964.

At the end of June, Prime Minister Inönü paid an official visit to Washington, D.C. to confer with President Johnson. The talks between the two leaders produced two significant outcomes. The first was that they appeared to remove much of the confusion that was affecting the U.S.-Turkey relationship. The second outcome was that the groundwork was laid for Dean Acheson and UN mediator Sakari S. Tuomioja to attempt to achieve a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Acheson Plan was to be a compromise concerning the possession of military bases on Cyprus and sovereignty over various areas of the island. Unfortunately, this plan was not successful. However, due to actions taken by the Turkish Government in supporting the Turkish Cypriots (air strikes modeled after those used by the U.S. forces in Vietnam), an era of comparative calm came to the island (4:118).

Change in Support

The military planning for a "flexible response" instead of "massive retaliation" implied that "the ability of all NATO states to absorb initial blows by heavily armored Soviet bloc forces without surrendering large tracts of territory [4:153]" would have to be strengthened. In relation to the Republic of Turkey, this would be interpreted to be an increase in the mobility and support of the forces that would

be sent to the country's defense lines. The level of support and assistance that would be needed for this program would be far superior to that provided to Turkey in the past. Unfortunately, the Turks sought even greater assistance than the U.S. Congress was willing to authorize to fulfill the program's requirements.

In February 1966, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton traveled to Ankara in an attempt to lessen the Turkish criticism of the U.S.'s reluctance to provide the proper (at least in their eyes) military support for the Republic. It was McNaughton's proposal that the Turks place the majority of its modernization effort on its ground forces, with little of the aid going to the Air Force and even less to the Navy. It was promised that the U.S. Sixth Fleet and U.S. aircraft squadrons would be tasked to deploy to Turkey in the event of a crisis.

The Turkish military authorities made no secret of their unhappiness with McNaughton's suggestions. There were several areas that caused their authorities to cast doubt on the appropriateness of this program for the Turkish Republic. First was that in a time when the Turkish Government was formulating plans to develop and implement a "National Force," the control and actual employment of military resources in the defense of the Republic would be left in the hands of an external power. Additionally, while there were reports that the U.S. was strengthening the Greek naval forces, there was great dissatisfaction because the program did not build up

the Turkish Navy. This Greek superiority, it was felt, could have disastrous ramifications in the event of additional problems on Cyprus.

It was also felt that the amount of funds that was to be provided under this plan (\$134 million per year) would not be in keeping with the greater sums that had been provided in the past. Additionally, there was the concern that the unequal allocation of funds between the service components could lead to a disruption of close ties that had been formed among the branches of the military. Finally, the doubt that had been planted in the minds of the Turks by the "Johnson Letter" was brought to light again. This doubt generated concern regarding the effectiveness of NATO in the event of confrontation with the Soviet Union. This proposal, which was to entail "heavier reliance on NATO reinforcement for basic defense, was likely to be exceedingly unpalatable to any Turkish regime [4:154]."

In the face of Turkish insistence that the aid provided be allocated in a more even manner to its military branches, and "not wishing to foul the atmosphere for the comprehensive renegotiation of all outstanding bilateral accords which Ankara had requested in the spring of 1966, Washington backed down somewhat [4:157]." In Washington's "backing down," and in conjunction with NATO plans for a "Naval On-Call Force" to be on hand in the Mediterranean and the acquisition of surplus U.S. naval vessels, the Turkish authorities were able to proceed with plans for a more balanced

force (4:158-159).

Cyprus 1967

In mid-November 1967, the "calm" that had existed on the island of Cyprus was shattered, and the Turkish Government again prepared to use military intervention to protect their interests on the island. Again caught in the middle between two allies, President Johnson urgently dispatched Cyrus R. Vance as a special envoy to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia (the Capital of Cyprus) in an attempt to alleviate the situation (49:31-32). Former Under Secretary of Defense Vance, through skillful diplomatic negotiations, succeeded in preventing open conflict between Greece and Turkey. This was accomplished without alienating the Turkish Government in the manner that the Johnson Letter had. For his efforts, Vance was to receive the publicly declared gratitude of Prime Minister İnönü and the Turkish people. "The Vance mission . . . had done much to salve the wounds of the past [4:123]."

Defense Cooperation Agreement of 1969

In view of the changing world situation and the past experiences of the Turkish Republic with the support of the U.S., it was felt that it was time that the existing bilateral agreements be brought up to date and the relationship between the two nations be renegotiated. It was the Turkish desire to reaffirm the Turkish sovereignty and to have control of the U.S.-Turkey military relationship. In order to achieve their

desires, there were certain requirements that were to be placed in this overall agreement. Several of these are as follows (4:162-163):

1. "The right to initiate negotiations looking toward abrogation of the bilateral understanding "
2. The U.S. would not use the military facilities (bases) as a "sovereign lessee," but on a shared basis with Turkey "for mutually benefit purposes"
3. Turkey would gain the "right to have full and detailed knowledge before granting permission for any American activity"
4. The Turkish Government "desired categorical guarantees that the United States would support Turkey against attack from any quarter for any reason."

The negotiations to complete this accord were started in late 1966 and ended on July 3, 1969, when the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed. Upon the acceptance of this document, various previously completed agreements were replaced. Two of these replaced documents were the Status of Forces Agreement of June 23, 1954, and the Duty Status Agreement of September 24, 1968 (12:245).

Reduction of Personnel and Facilities

In 1968 the U.S. military began a world-wide reduction of overseas military personnel.

The gradual decline in the numbers of U.S. officials and their dependents, from a high of about 24,000 in 1967 to about 16,000 by the end of 1970, was accompanied by a reduction in activity and function [4:168].

In 1968 "Site 23," an important complex situated outside Ankara, was turned over to exclusive Turkish use, as were other facilities in this reduction of personnel and installations.

Turkish Sovereignty

There were two major incidents that were used by the Turks to indicate to the U.S. and the world its desire to display its sovereignty and to control the actions that took place within its borders. In each case the U.S. was informed that bases within Turkey could not be utilized as military staging areas without the explicit permission of the Turkish Government. The first was during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in June 1967, when Turkey was eager to court Arab votes in respect to Cyprus in the United Nations, and in view of the possible ramifications within the UN, did not wish to alienate any possibly friendly nations.

The second incident demonstrated Turkey's position even clearer. During the Lebanon Crisis of October 1969, then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel felt it necessary to announce that interference in the "internal affairs" of another country was not one of the purposes of the joint U.S.-Turkey bases. In doing so, he stated that Turkey would not let its territory be used for intervention in Lebanon. This policy of non-interference was to remain in effect as long as late 1970. At this time, it was necessary for the Turkish Foreign Minister to publicly deny the rumors that Incirlik

Air Base was being used as a staging base for U.S. forces to be used against Palestinian commandos in Jordan (4:166).

Civil Unrest

At the end of the 1960's and in the beginning of the 1970's, the feelings that the Turkish people had for the U.S. took a turn for the worse. The effect of the Johnson Letter and the lack of expected U.S. support of the Turkish Republic provided a broad base for a rise in anti-U.S. feelings. These feelings led to open anti-American demonstrations in the streets of Turkey and riots in Turkish ports. The most notable of these incidents was referred to as "Bloody Sunday" by the Turkish press. This riot in February 1969 took place during a visit of the U.S. Sixth Fleet to Istanbul. This clash of right and leftist students resulted in several fatal stabbings, and brought forth the question as to whether the visits of U.S. warships were worth the troubles that ensued (4:170). Due to the hostile reactions to fleet visits, the next U.S. naval vessel to anchor at Istanbul was the U.S. destroyer "Furse," on August 16, 1971 (106:3).

These riots and acts of violence were not solely directed against the U.S. Navy. During 1971, in two separate incidents, a total of five USAF personnel were kidnapped by leftist extremists. Fortunately all five men were returned alive and without the requested ransom of \$400,000 being paid (82:24). In addition to these acts, the violence took the form of terrorist bombings of U.S. buildings and possessions

such as the U.S. Consulate and the Amer-Turkish Trading Bank in March 1971 (69:11).

Move to Modernize

In March 1972, in a move to strengthen the U.S.-Turkey relationship, Turkish Premier Nihat Erim paid an official visit to President Richard M. Nixon and other state officials (100:13). While in Washington, Premier Erim informed U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird of the Turkish plans to modernize, with U.S. help, the Turkish Army. This modernization move was to include a reduction of force from 500,000 to 400,000 personnel with a matching increase in firepower by the replacement of outdated weapon systems. In reply, President Nixon expressed the support of Turkey's efforts by the U.S. and confirmed that the U.S. would continue to assist the Turkish defense program (88:10).

CHAPTER IV

THE EMBARGO PERIOD, 1974-1978

The Cypriot Conflict

In the spring of 1974, word of an impending Greek coup against President Makarios of Cyprus began to leak from Athens to Washington. The rumors were allegedly confirmed on June 20, when the extremist Greek General Ioannidas, Director of the Greek Military Police, revealed the plans for a coup to a CIA contact in order to test Washington's reaction. The warnings the Greeks received from the U.S. were considered "diplomatic window dressing [52:50]," and plans for the coup were continued.

President Makarios also learned of the plot and elected to counter the threat directly. On July 2 he wrote a letter to the Greek President, accusing his military government of conspiring to overthrow the Government of Cyprus. Makarios demanded the recall of 650 Greek Army officers who were serving as advisors to the Cyprus National Guard, which was composed entirely of Greek Cypriots (13:64). On July 5, details of the plot and the letter were published in a Nicosia newspaper in hopes that international pressure would dissuade the Greeks from action. These hopes were not to be met.

On July 15, 1974 the Cyprus National Guard began action to take control of the island. By July 17, they had

established a firm control. As Makarios fled for his life, a radical right-wing newspaper publisher and former Greek Cypriot terrorist execution squad leader, Nikos Sampson, was declared President. In view of his previous anti-Turkish activity, he was an unacceptable choice for both Turks and Turk Cypriots (49:41).

The U.S. did not initially make any statements or take any action to place responsibility for the coup with the Greek junta, or to request withdrawal of the Greek officers who had led the coup (52:52-53). This seemed to imply a tacit approval of Sampson as the leader of Cyprus. Nor did the Turks see any action being taken to restore the neutral government of Makarios. In fact, all signs indicated that "enosis" was about to become a reality. Their concern for the Turkish community in Cyprus grew.

As emotions quickly built in Turkey, the nation's Prime Minister, Mr. Ecevit, flew to London for emergency consultations with the British co-guarantors of Cyprus independence. He warned that military action would be used if diplomatic measures did not quickly solve the problem (49:44). At the same time, Turkish forces were massing on the Mediterranean coast.

The American Ambassador to Greece took the threat of a Turkish invasion very seriously, and requested the U.S. Sixth Fleet be sent to the area of Cyprus. This idea was rejected by Secretary of State Kissinger as "hysterical" (57:13).

Although Under Secretary of State Sisco began a round

of shuttle diplomacy in an effort to resolve the crisis, it appeared to be designed only to prevent war between Turkey and Greece, not to resolve the problems or correct the violations of Cyprus' sovereignty. On 20 July, after an all-night meeting with the Turkish Cabinet, Ecevit informed Sisco that "We have done it your way for 10 years, now we are going to do it our way [67:40]." That same day, 6000 Turkish troops landed in Cyprus. Over the next two days, another 25,000 Turkish troops reinforced them. Although a UN-sponsored ceasefire went into effect on July 22, the Turks continued to land troops and consolidate their positions.

On July 23 the Greek junta collapsed after an attempt to mobilize their nation against the Turks failed. Control of the government was returned to the civilians. On the same day, Sampson ceded the Presidency of Cyprus to the President of the Cypriot House of Representatives, Glafcos Clerides (49:47). In spite of the changes in leadership in both Greece and Cyprus, international negotiations to provide a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem proved fruitless.

These talks broke down on August 14. Within hours, the Turks began a three-day campaign that would leave them in control of the northern 40 percent of the island. The next ceasefire on July 27 began a brief period of relative calm in the relations between the U.S. and Turkey.

From the time the U.S. originally heard rumors of the proposed coup until the Turks invaded Cyprus on July 20,

American policy either failed to provide sufficient warning to the opposing parties concerning repercussions of their actions, or found that their warnings were not heeded. In other words, the situation could no longer be contained by U.S. diplomacy as it had been in 1964 and 1967.

Even after the initial invasion on July 20, U.S. statements appeared to be aimed at stopping the conflict, not resolving the issues. Both Greece and Turkey were condemned for their military action, but the Turks apparently interpreted our policy statements as being sympathetic to their cause (49:48). In fact, on 15 August Premier Ecevit told reporters that Turkey was very happy with the frank and open policy of the U.S. on Cyprus (47:29).

The United States, on the other hand, was deeply embroiled in and preoccupied with the Watergate crisis. On August 9, 1974, President Nixon submitted his resignation. Not only was the nation in turmoil, but the Congress was determined to reassert itself in foreign policy.

Development of the Embargo

The issue of a military aid embargo did not originate with the Cyprus invasion. The idea had been proposed previously in the U.S. Congress as a way to put pressure on Turkey and other nations to cut opium production (52:61). It was through these actions that the idea of an embargo was planted.

On August 29, the New York Times reported on a strong controversy surrounding the routine transfer of an amphibious

landing craft, "Westchester County," to Turkey. The action, which was to take place in Seattle, Washington, had prompted Senator Henry Jackson (DEM-WA) to send a telegram to the President urging the suspension of all economic and military aid to Turkey until their forces withdrew from Cyprus (83:12).

In response to growing political pressures, including extensive lobbying on the part of pro-Greek groups, certain elements in Congress began to press the efforts to cut aid to Turkey. They achieved their first success on September 19, 1974. Senator Eagleton (DEM-MO) introduced an amendment which stated the Senate's position that the President should immediately stop all military aid to Turkey. The rationale for the action was that Turkey had used weapons supplied by America through foreign aid programs. This violated both Section 505(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (24:436) and Chapter 1, Section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (25:1322-1323). Both Acts are worded much the same. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically stated that

Military assistance to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security [24:4362].

The House took action on September 24 to attach an amendment to a normally routine continuing appropriations bill (HJ Res 1131). The amendment called for a stop to all military aid to Turkey "until the President certified that

substantial progress had been made regarding military forces on Cyprus [52:64]."

These two points, the legality of the use of U.S. arms and Presidential certification of progress in reaching a Cyprus settlement, were key issues for Congress. President Ford's Administration and key legislative leaders, countered that any legislation imposing an aid cutoff to Turkey would hinder Secretary of State Kissinger's efforts to negotiate a solution.

From October 9 to October 17, Congress sent three bills to Ford. Ford vetoed the first two (HJ Res 1131 and HJ Res 1163), and Congress failed to override the vetoes. The third resolution (HJ Res 1167) was reluctantly signed into PL 93-448 by Ford only because it also provided emergency funding for federal agencies and departments and the foreign aid program (26:1363-1364). They had been without funding since the previous legislation had expired September 30 (2:14-A). This law called for a ban on U.S. military assistance to Turkey, effective December 10, 1974, until the President certified both that Turkey was in compliance with the U.S. laws and that "substantial progress had been made toward agreement on military forces in Cyprus [26:1363-1364]."

Although the law would not allow Turkey to ship U.S.-made war materials such as tanks, planes, artillery and ammunition to Cyprus, noncombat equipment such as trucks, medical supplies and canteens were permitted. It required that Turkey honor the ceasefire, and not increase its forces on Cyprus (84:1).

In less than a month, Congress had voted 16 times on the issue (52:68).

Since this legislation had been passed as a part of a continuing appropriations resolution, it was only effective to the end of the then current fiscal year. The vehicle which would provide for a permanent embargo was the regular foreign aid legislation which was passed by Congress on December 18 (27:1801-1802). In the process of compromising to ensure passage of this legislation, the implementation of the embargo was delayed until February 5, 1975.

In spite of the legislative battle being waged, U.S. military assistance to Turkey had continued. A U.S. Defense Department spokesman announced on 23 August that there had been brief delays in the shipment of aircraft to Turkey during the Cyprus fighting. He declined to comment on whether the delays had been ordered to put pressure on Turkey to end the fighting. He did indicate that the shipments were continuing "unabated" as of that date. It was clearly indicated that the delays should not be interpreted as a threat to cut aid, and that no decision had been made "on arms aid at any time for the purpose of putting pressure on Turkey [73:4]."

On September 10, the DoD announced the signing of a \$225.8 million contract to McDonnell Douglas to produce F-4Es. Most of these aircraft were believed to be destined for Greece and Turkey (75:7). From July through the end of September 1974, \$40.5 million worth of equipment, including F-4Es, bombs, missiles, ammunition, and trucks were shipped to Turkey.

In the three months preceding the invasion, the U.S. had delivered to Turkey only \$27.3 million worth of military equipment (74:7).

The reaction of the Turkish Government to the embargo debate showed remarkable restraint in the early stages of the debate. It was clear to them that the Administration of President Ford was fighting the embargo, and that pro-Greek forces in Congress were pressing the issue. On November 14, Turkey announced the withdrawal of 5,000 of the approximately 40,000 troops they had in Cyprus, possibly as a concession to the U.S. (96:10).

This was followed on January 15, 1975 by a U.S. Department of Defense announcement of a \$230 million aid package for Turkey to provide kits to modernize 885 M-48 tanks. Although the DoD claimed that there was no intention to circumvent the embargo, the move created considerable suspicion (72:1).

As the date for imposition of the embargo drew near, Turkey announced withdrawal of another 1,000 troops from Cyprus. This left approximately 34,000 still in Cyprus. If this was another attempt to placate Congress, it was considered as too little too late (94:6).

On February 5, 1975 there was still confusion over whether the embargo went into effect beginning that day or the next. As it turned out, U.S. ships were ordered to take cargos bound for Turkey to other American depots beginning February 6 (76:13).

The Turks indicated on February 5 that, although they would not leave NATO, the embargo could put them in a position where they could not fulfill their commitments to protect the southeastern flank of Europe (99:5). Warnings that sanctions might have to be taken against U.S. bases in Turkey had been made previously, and were repeated at this time. This subject would be raised many times over the next few months.

In April, newly-elected Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey again pledged Turkish allegiance to NATO, but he declared that they would be independent of U.S. weapons (86:36).

The imposition of the embargo deeply affected the Turkish nation. The Congress had used the FAA of 1961 and the FMS Act of 1968 as the basis for their contention that the invasion used U.S.-supplied arms illegally. However, the rhetoric which came from Washington prior to the second invasion on August 14 appeared to be sympathetic to the Turkish cause. On the one hand, the U.S. seemed to be saying that the Turks had a just cause for invasion, while on the other hand, we were saying that the use of U.S. arms was wrong. Since the Turkish military was supplied with its military equipment and supplies almost exclusively by the U.S., any military action had to entail the use of military equipment supplied by the U.S. Our "Invasion, Yes! Arms, No!" logic seemed truly ridiculous (56:28).

The Congressional backers of the embargo used several arguments in their drive. The basic one was the illegality of the Turkish acts. However, they were also trying to

re-establish a Congressional role in foreign policy and decrease the power of Dr. Kissinger to establish policy as he wished (52:92). Some members felt the embargo would force Turkey to negotiate peacefully on the Cyprus issue. Other arguments expressed the views that the U.S. could not back down now that it had taken a stand on the issue.

The opponents of the legislation insisted the embargo would decrease their power to carry on negotiations over Cyprus because it would harden the Turkish position. In addition, they pointed out the danger of weakening NATO (2:14-A).

The Turkish Response

Turkey was now left without its primary source of arms. However, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and others were working almost continuously with Congress to repeal the embargo. Although Turkish resentment against the cutoff was growing and threats to take action against the U.S. installations were becoming more frequent, they continued to trust in the Administration's ability to change the mood of Congress.

The first concrete sign of change occurred on March 26, 1975 when Bill S846, permitting resumption of military aid to Turkey, was considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was sent to the full Senate, where it barely passed (41-40) on May 19. The House version (HR 5918) was introduced on April 14, but became bogged down by delaying tactics.

The Turkish Government felt at this time that it had been patient long enough. On June 15, Turkey indicated that it would have to revise its military commitments. Accordingly, the United States was requested to begin negotiations within 30 days on the future of U.S. facilities in Turkey. The Turks implied that base closures could be considered (101:5). The official notice of the request was received in Washington on June 17. This notice stated that unless the embargo was lifted within 30 days, there would be a change in status. At the same time, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed the hope that the embargo would not strain other Turkish-American relationships (102:6).

The Administration's efforts to repeal the embargo were accelerated, and some congressmen began to switch to the Administration's position. On July 9, a compromise bill was being worked which would release \$51 million worth of equipment which the Turks had already paid for. In addition, it provided for \$133 million in long-term loans for new sales. Thus, there was some optimism when base renegotiations began on July 17 (52:73).

These hopes for rapid settlement of this issue were dashed on July 24, 1975 when the House of Representatives voted 223-206 to leave the embargo in effect. Turkish frustration had now risen to a point where it was felt that some action had to be taken.

The next day, July 25, the government of Turkey announced that:

1. Turkey would take control of all 27 U.S. facilities in Turkey, beginning July 26 (2:25-A).

2. Virtually all activity on all installations except the Incirlik NATO base would cease. However, they did allow the U.S. to run certain electronic equipment in a stand-by mode. Because of the nature of some equipment, a complete shutdown would have resulted in rapid deterioration of components, which would have caused lengthy delays and tremendous costs to repair once the facilities were reopened.

3. The 7,000 military personnel assigned to these installations were free to stay or leave, as far as Turkey was concerned (95:14).

By July 29, the takeover was complete. Turkey announced that some of the bases would remain closed, even if the embargo were lifted (87:1). These actions were defended by a Turkish statement that the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two nations was no longer valid. This agreement had been the basis for the operation of the American facilities. In their view, the U.S. had "unilaterally" renounced the pact (13:229).

In the United States, a final attempt was made to lift the embargo on July 30 and 31. Although the bill was passed by the Senate (47-46), the House was able to keep the bill from coming to the floor. On August 1, Congress recessed until September 9, with the bill still in committee in the House.

Many of the thoughts of the Turks and the Ford

Administration were summarized by these words from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger: "Turkey has been singled out with a degree of stringency that previously was reserved for those who were thought to be incorrigible enemies [78:5]."

At the time the President and Secretary Kissinger were in Helsinki, Finland, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Ford repeated an offer which had been made three times since March to provide Turkey with \$50 million in emergency assistance. This could be made available under special Presidential authority without Congressional approval. The Turkish Prime Minister Demirel turned him down, stating there was "something contradictory" about a \$50 million offer for free aid while, at the same time, they were prevented from buying U.S. equipment with their own money (85:3).

The arms embargo was more than a "slap in the face" to the Turks. Since the Truman Doctrine had first brought the two nations together, Turkey had looked to the United States as the real strength in NATO. American military aid was regarded as an "indicator of their country's value to the Western Alliance [13:278]," and the embargo indicated a decrease in their strategic status.

The Turks also felt that they had shown they were "true" friends of the Americans beginning with their participation in the Korean conflict. Now, all of the slights which they had received throughout the 1960's, along with the embargo, caused them to question whether we were truly their

friends.

Impact of the Base Closures

The Incirlik installation, located in south-central Turkey, provided the most forward deployed, land-based American aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean, capable of launching a tactical nuclear strike. American F-4 Phantom jets were rotated to Incirlik from Spain on a regular basis (31:41). The facility also provided a training base for these fighters, and a refueling stop for aircraft flying to and from the Middle East (65:62). This was the only U.S. facility in Turkey which was not closed.

Other U.S. facilities in Turkey were also discussed in a Library of Congress report to the House Committee on International Relations in 1977 (31:39-47), portions of which are paraphrased here. These facilities provided key intelligence, communications, and ammunition and supply depots and other support to American forces. The most important were those associated with intelligence gathering. These facilities were crucial links in monitoring Soviet compliance with Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) Agreements, in addition to providing other information on Soviet military activities and testing of missiles, satellites, and nuclear weapons. Largest of these were Sinop, on the coast of the Black Sea, and Karamursel Air Station on the Sea of Marmara. Other important bases were Diyarbakir Air Station in southeastern Turkey, and Balbasi Station near

Ankara in central Turkey.

Approximately 25 percent of the data the U.S. obtained on Soviet missile launches came from intelligence sites in Turkey. Geographic location made surveillance of Russian sites at Kapustin Yar (east of Volgograd) and Tyura Tam (near the Aral Sea) especially convenient. The site at Tyura Tam was the Soviet center for MIRV testing (see Fig. 1).

Although much of the information obtained was used to confirm data obtained from other sources, the Library of Congress study concluded that at least some data could not be replaced by relocating facilities in other countries or by any other means. The analysis also indicated that only Greece and Iran had the geographic location necessary to gather the same type of military intelligence data available in Turkey. Even if some facilities had been recommended for transfer, the willingness of the Greek government to accept them would have been difficult to gauge under the circumstances. The impact of any decision to relocate facilities to Iran can best be appreciated by considering events that have occurred since that time (31:44-47).

Sinop provided radar monitoring and communications capability for collecting data on Soviet naval and air activity in the Black Sea area and Soviet missile testing. As a component of the National Security Agency (NSA), it was manned by personnel from the Army Security Agency.

The facility at Karamursel was a U.S. communications and monitoring site. It was responsible for tracking Soviet




Fig. 4-1. U.S.S.R. Missile Test Ranges and Military Headquarters
[6:Cover; 10:95]

naval traffic in and around the Straits, and in the western Black Sea. The USAF Security Service (USAFSS) provided personnel for this work.

Another facility which provided key, long-range radar and communications monitoring of Soviet missile launches and other military activities was Diyarbakir. Personnel from USAFSS also operated this base. Balbasi conducted seismographic detection for the purpose of monitoring Soviet nuclear testing.

Fourteen NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) sites provided 24-hour early warning in the event of hostile troop movements. Various U.S. Defense Communications System (DCS) facilities located throughout Turkey connected these various facilities to each other and to other NATO installations in Europe through terminals in Greece. In addition, the terminal at Diyarbakir provided satellite relay capability to Lakehurst Naval Air Station in Lakehurst, New Jersey.

The most important U.S. supply, POL and storage facilities in the eastern Mediterranean were located at Iskenderum and Yumurtalik on the Mediterranean coast near Syria. A U.S. Navy LORAN station on the north shore of the Sea of Marmara used electronic radio-navigation to provide long-range position fixes to U.S. military craft in the Mediterranean.

Headquarters for the U.S. Logistics Group - Turkey (TUSLOG) were located in Ankara. This group provided for American military supply and maintenance support throughout Turkey. NATO's LANDSOUTHEAST command and the 6th Allied




Fig. 4.2. Major United States Military Installations in Turkey [31:38]

Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF) at Izmir on the west coast of Turkey provided interface with the NATO structure. The Cigli Air Base, a few miles north of Izmir, was a USAFE tactical air base.

Partial Lifting of the
Embargo

The Turkish action to close the U.S. bases forced many congressmen to focus on the strategic military value of Turkey. After the recess, many members of Congress switched their position to favor lifting the embargo because "they were concerned about a deterioration of the U.S. national security position as a result of the closure of the bases [2:25-A]."

On October 2, 1975 the House passed S2230. Additional support came because of an amendment requesting the President to open talks with Turkey on ways to cut illegal opium exports. The President signed S2230 into law (PL 94-104) on October 6 (28:508-510). Although the new law was a first step, it did not restore the relations between the two nations to pre-embargo status.

In the first place, the new law only provided for a partial lifting of the embargo. Direct military aid grants were still prohibited. The law did permit:

1. the delivery of \$184.9 million in equipment which Turkey had contracted for prior to the embargo (including 24 F-4Es);
2. cash sales of military equipment on the commercial market;

3. future sales, agreements, and credits by the American Government for equipment deemed necessary to support Turkey's NATO commitments. Actual amounts authorized to fill this need would be authorized in the annual foreign military sales act authorization bill (2:25-A).

These sales and deliveries were conditioned on both Turkey's observance of the ceasefire and its agreement not to send any of the arms or any additional forces to Cyprus.

On the other hand, the Turks would not allow the U.S. bases to be reactivated until a new Defense Cooperation Agreement was reached. Negotiations began on October 28, 1975. The plan proposed by Turkey called for the following:

1. The United States would make a \$1.5 billion annual payment for use of the bases. This amount would compensate Turkey for the risk of reprisal it faced by hosting these installations. It would also offset the loss of production on the land allocated to the bases.

2. The bases would be under the command of a Turkish officer. An American would serve as deputy. Previous arrangements had allowed for completely separate military structures for each nation on each base, although Turkey technically owned the bases.

3. The bases would be used solely for defense of NATO.

4. The U.S. would pay all costs for operating the bases.

5. The U.S. would request Turkish permission before

installing new equipment on the bases (97:7).

The U.S. promptly rejected the huge annual payment as impossible under the conditions of the NATO Alliance.

While negotiations continued, Congress was taking action on the annual foreign aid bill. On March 4, 1976 the House passed the bill which called for \$50 million in grants to Turkey and up to \$125 million in additional credits. This bill was enacted by Congress on June 30, 1976 as the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (29:757).

On March 26, 1976 a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was signed by representatives of both nations. The agreement provided for military grants, credits, and loan guarantees worth \$1 billion to be provided to Turkey over a four-year period. Once the agreement was placed into force, the U.S. bases closed by Turkey would be allowed to resume operations. Because the agreement called for a multi-year commitment on the part of the U.S., it required ratification by Congress (108).

Unfortunately, negotiations for a new Greek DCA had been taking place concurrently. When the Turkish agreement was announced, the Greeks reacted by first breaking off negotiations, and then demanding the same agreement with "Greece" substituted for "Turkey" in the wording, despite great differences between the two nations. "Greek friends in Congress" indicated they would not consider the Turkish-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement until the Greek agreement was available

at the same time. It became obvious to U.S. negotiators that the Greeks were stalling to avoid reaching an agreement in order to prevent the Turkish DCA from becoming effective. As a result of these pressures and demands that the Cyprus issue be resolved before the DCA could be approved, the 1976 DCA between the U.S. and Turkey was never ratified by either nation's legislature (108).

The 7-10 Ratio

The negotiation of the DCAs with both Greece and Turkey did result in one lasting arrangement which affected the U.S. aid to Turkey for the next three years. Assistance to Turkey would have been \$1 billion over the four-year life of the agreement. The Greek DCA called for \$700 million for Greece over the same period of time. Even though neither agreement ever went into effect, this 7-10 ratio became an accepted proportion for providing U.S. assistance to the two nations.

When the embargo was eventually lifted in 1978, Congress bowed to Greek-American pressure and put the following words into that year's legislation, the International Security Assistance Act of 1978, amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961:

Sec. 6.20c(b)(4). The United States will furnish security assistance for Greece and Turkey only when furnishing that assistance is intended solely for defensive purposes, including when necessary for the recipient country to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries of the region, including between Greece and Turkey, is preserved. Nothing in this

paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the transfer of defense articles to Greece or Turkey for the legitimate self-defense or to enable Greece or Turkey to fulfill their North Atlantic Treaty Organization obligations [30:738].

This was used as the basis for continuing the 7-10 relationship. Although the actual ratio was accepted as a guideline, it never existed in any legislation.

The quoted FAA amendment has raised many questions concerning the "existing balance" in the region in 1978. For instance, at the time the law was passed, 50 percent of the Turkish aircraft were non-operational because of the lack of parts. Although this was a part of the balance in 1978, it obviously was not the intent of Congress to limit the Turkish military to 50 percent effectiveness (108).

Repeal of the Embargo

In 1977 the Carter Administration took office and attempted a fresh look at the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus problem. Clark Clifford visited the area at the direction of the President, and came back convinced the embargo should be lifted (108). In spite of this, little activity took place in 1977 to resolve the issue.

The administration efforts up to this time had concentrated on ratification of the DCA, with the intention of using the ratified agreement as the emphasis for lifting the embargo. Congress still refused to ratify the DCA until the Cyprus issue was resolved; and the Turks refused to negotiate to clear up Cyprus until the DCA was ratified (90:IV-19). In

addition, the Greek negotiators continued to delay reaching agreement on their DCA (108).

This stalemate was finally broken as a result of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher's visit with Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey in March 1978. U.S. policy now shifted and emphasis was placed on lifting the embargo without waiting for Cyprus concessions (77:1).

During June pressures rapidly built to end the embargo. Carter declared this was the "most immediate and urgent foreign policy decision" facing Congress (44:1091-1100), and detailed an all-out drive to gain repeal. The effort included meetings with Congressmen, testimony and lobbying by top officials from the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA, Presidential meetings with Greek-American leaders, and pressure from many key Congressmen.

The Senate finally voted to repeal the embargo on July 25. The House followed suit on August 2. On September 26, 1978 President Carter formally lifted the embargo (30:738).

The lifting of the embargo prompted Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey to allow the resumption of U.S. military activities on the bases for a one-year period. This time would be used to negotiate a new agreement on defense cooperation. However, the Karamursel base would be turned over to the Turkish military (13:279).

CHAPTER V

AFTERMATH OF THE EMBARGO

Need for Recovery

By the time the embargo ended, many people were stating that the Turkish military had been severely weakened. General Alexander Haig, the Commander of NATO, indicated in July 1978 that less than half of Turkey's aircraft were operational (89:8). Less than a year later, in May 1979, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "at least one half of Turkey's major military equipment was inoperable, and much of the rest was obsolete [13:267]." It was generally stated that the inability to obtain spare parts, and the fact that much of the equipment was out of date, was leading to rapid deterioration of military equipment. In addition, morale of the Turkish military personnel suffered noticeably because of the poor state of the obviously antiquated equipment. These conditions were said to be seriously limiting Turkey's capability to defend its corner of NATO against the comparatively sophisticated equipment of potential adversaries.

The magnitude of Turkey's problem with aging weapon systems can be better appreciated by looking at some selected systems in use in Turkey and other NATO nations (Table 5-1). All of these systems were originally produced in the U.S.

TABLE 5-1

Selected NATO Weapons Systems Strength
Basic Systems Built Prior to 1964, by U.S.

	1975		1978		1980	
	Turkey	Other NATO	Turkey	Other NATO	Turkey	Other NATO
Aircraft						
F-84 (1946)	32	62-Greece	-	-	-	-
RF-84 (1946)	20	18-Greece	-	20-Greece	6	-
F-86 (1952)	-	25-Portugal	-	-	-	-
F-100C/O/F (1955)	45	n/a-Canada ¹ 40-Denmark	100	8-Canada 38-Denmark	100 ²	7-Canada 32-Denmark ³
F-102A (1953)	36	56-France 16-Greece	30	-	-	-
C-47 (WWII)	20	8-Denmark 35-Greece 10-Italy 16-Portugal	30	8-Denmark 25-Greece	30	8-Denmark 20-Greece
EC-47 (WWII)	-	-	-	11-Italy	-	11-Italy
C-54 (1942)	3	5-Denmark	3	-	3	-
C-119 (1947)	-	32-Italy	-	28-Italy	-	-
EC-119 (WWII)	-	-	-	2-Italy	-	-
TANKS						
M-47 Med. Tank (1951)		124-Belgium 300-Greece 700-Italy 100-Portugal		52-Belgium 300-Greece 650-Italy 90-Portugal	3000	62-Belgium 350-Greece 550-Italy 34-Portugal
M-48 Med. Tank ⁵ (1952)	1500 ⁴	500-Greece 38-Norway	2800 ⁴	750-Greece 38-Norway 23-Portugal	500 ⁶	800-Greece 38-Norway

TABLE 5-1, continued:

- ¹ Data not available separately. Jointly, Canada had a total of 30 F-100 and T-33.
- ² Approximately 50 believed to be in storage
- ³ Being replaced by F-16
- ⁴ Combined strength for both M-47 and M-48
- ⁵ Does not include M-48 A2/A5 modified systems
- ⁶ Upgrade of approximately 200 anticipated under FRG assistance program

NOTE: The date in () by the system designation indicates first production date for the system.

SOURCES: (13:315-318; 15:126-130; 45:1-14; 59:55-62; 63:74-88; 64:62-85)

prior to 1964.

The table provides an indication of the number of these antiquated systems in use at the end of the year the embargo was first in effect (1975), the year the embargo was lifted (1978), and the most current year. While most nations have been ridding their inventory of these systems, Turkey has continued to utilize several. In the case of the RF-84, the aircraft were retired and then brought back into service. Many of these older systems were apparently out of commission, or in use as a source of spare parts to keep other systems operating when the embargo was ended.

The Turkish Government and military had recognized the potential problems of aging weapon systems well before the Cyprus conflict. Government budgets had provided a high priority to military modernization beginning in the 1970's. Only expenditures of the Ministry of Finance were higher during this period. However, this spending was primarily to cover the "cost of maintaining the large military force." Up until the mid-1970's, the United States had absorbed "most of the foreign-exchange cost of equipment and most of the training of military technicians [13:256]."

In 1973 Turkey formally established a ten-year plan to provide for reorganization of its military and modernization of their equipment. The program, called REMO, called for increasing amounts of funds to be dedicated to investment in modern military equipment (54:25; 13:256).

The U.S. arms embargo and the deteriorating state of

the economy presented tremendous roadblocks to these Turkish efforts to improve the military (13:267). At the same time the embargo was coming to an end, Turkey was undergoing a severe balance-of-payments crisis, which pushed the nation close to bankruptcy (13:129). The huge increases in defense expenditures could barely keep ahead of the soaring inflation (see Table 5-2). The military needs for spare parts and modern equipment could not be met with purchases from any nation without increasing their already inflated debt.

Turkish Alternatives for Recovery

During the three years of the embargo and in the years immediately following it, Turkey could have considered five possible sources for obtaining military equipment and spares.

1. U.S.S.R.
2. Arab nations, or other Third World nations
3. Other NATO nations
4. The United States (limited to a credit basis from the partial lifting of the embargo in October 1975 to the lifting of the embargo in 1978)
5. Domestic production

The relationship between Turkey and the U.S.S.R. was modified somewhat by the embargo. The policy of detente had decreased Turkish fears of Soviet invasion. Then the embargo encouraged both the Soviets and the Turks to seek better relations with their neighbors. The economic difficulties of

TABLE 5-2
Military Expenditures and Manpower Levels, 1969-79

Year	Defense Expenditure (in billions of Turkish lira)	Defense as Percent of Total Expenditure	Defense as Percent of GNP ¹	Military Manpower	Paramilitary Forces
1969	4.28	19.1	4.3	483,000	40,000
1970	4.97	20.5	4.3	477,500	40,000
1971	7.12	19.1	4.4	508,500	75,000
1972	7.91	21.0	4.2	449,000	75,000
1973	10.02	19.9	4.0	455,000	75,000
1974 ²	13.67	20.3	3.8	453,000	75,000
1975	17.70	21.9	4.5	453,000	75,000
1976	39.20	23.8	5.6	460,000	75,000
1977	51.00	22.8	5.7	465,000	75,000
1978 ³	52.90	21.0	n/a	485,000	110,000
1979 ³	60.70	15.3	n/a	566,000	120,000
n/a -- not available					
¹ Gross national product					
² Does not include expenditures for Cyprus operation, estimated at TL5-10 billion					
³ Amounts represent budget allocations only					
SOURCE: (13:314)					

Turkey also encouraged the Ankara Government to pursue economic assistance from their former adversaries to the north.

In July 1975 Turkey received a promise for \$700 million in credits for additional construction for the improvement of industrial facilities that had been originally built with Soviet aid. Additional agreements provided for better relations between the two nations, increased cooperation in scientific, technical and cultural areas, and grants of \$1.2 billion in long-term Soviet credit for industrial development (13:232). In 1975 Turkey received more than half of all Soviet aid given that year (11:125).

In spite of this massive infusion of economic aid, Turkey did not obtain any military equipment from the Soviets. However, although they specifically stated they would not seek military aid from the Warsaw Pact nations (102:2), there were some indications that 60 Soviet helicopters were offered to Turkey (16:286).

Another factor which symbolized the lessening of tension between the two nations was the passage of the Soviet ship "Kiev" through the Straits in July 1976. The Montreux Convention had barred the passage of aircraft carriers. Most Western nations considered the Kiev, equipped with a flight deck, helicopters, and vertical short takeoff and landing (V-STOL) jet aircraft, as an aircraft carrier. The Soviets described it as an "anti-submarine cruiser," and Turkey accepted this (11:126; 54:15). Although these factors indicate a decrease in tension, the background of mistrust between

the two nations, and the fact that Turkey still accepted all NATO responsibilities, indicate that any large-scale Soviet military aid would have met with strong resistance from at least some Turkish elements.

Turkey also made overtures to various Arab nations, primarily because their oil and monetary backing were vitally needed to shore up the Turkish economy. However, Libya was apparently the only Arab or Third World nation to provide significant military assistance. In September 1975 seven F-5As were provided to Turkey as a gift from Libya (104:3). Previously, Libya also provided financing for 18 F-104S Starfighters which were purchased from Italy (13:317).

The other NATO allies had generally called upon the U.S. to lift the embargo, and expressed concern for Turkey's defense posture. Over the three years of the embargo, Turkey placed orders or received grants for significant amounts of equipment from France, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany (see Appendix I).

As European nations replaced aging systems, many of which were of U.S. origin, these systems were made available for transfer. Although some were very old, they provided equipment which complemented the existing Turkish force structure, provided for attrition, and cannibalization without placing strains on the Turkish economy.

The Federal Republic of Germany is generally regarded as the second leading provider of arms to Turkey behind the U.S. The Germans were especially helpful in providing naval

equipment from 1975 on. They also sold transport and training aircraft, although the Alpha trainers ordered in 1977 have apparently been changed to older G-91s (64:85).

The strong German assistance had begun in 1964, with a NATO defense donation being provided in 18-month installments. These installments began as 50 million marks in 1964, were raised to 100 million marks in 1969, and again in 1979 to 130 million marks. A total of 930 million marks in free gifts were received by Turkey in this period under this program alone. Other programs also provided large quantities of free aid, including funds and material (91:13). The conversion of these German marks to U.S. dollars was estimated to equate this aid to about \$20 million per year from 1964 through the late 1970's, but the figure was expected to rise considerably at that time (13:280). German assistance was especially valued because it was composed of grant aid to a large extent.

In another more recent case, Germany and Turkey agreed to a package which would provide four submarines to Turkey. Two of these were produced in Germany and turned over to Turkey in 1977 and 1978. One additional submarine, produced partly in Turkey and partly in Germany, was commissioned in 1980. The last is being produced fully in Turkey with German assistance and is scheduled to be commissioned in 1981 (46:8).

An additional package was in negotiation from January 1979 to late 1980. This reportedly provided 600 million

marks for the procurement of 77 Leopard tanks, 4 Leopard recovery tanks, the up-gunning and dieselization of 193 M-48 tanks, and the delivery of 249 launchers and roughly 5,000 Milan anti-tank guided weapons (91:13).

Other NATO-nation assistance consisted primarily of Milan anti-tank guided weapons from France, Italian anti-submarine warfare helicopters, F-104S fighter aircraft, and Sparrow air-to-air missiles (see Appendix I). Still other NATO nations have provided aid on a sporadic basis. In June 1978 Norway agreed to provide Turkey unspecified military equipment in return for commercial credits. There were indications that this equipment might include radar equipment for monitoring naval traffic and Penguin ship-to-ship missiles and launchers (13:280). Canada, in May 1980, pledged to give \$25 million over a 10-year period for the maintenance of T-33 aircraft, while the Netherlands agreed to provide 25 F-104s at a low price (91:13). Other discussions are taking place with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway concerning the transfer of F-104s, and with Denmark concerning F-100s (109).

U.S. Assistance

The U.S. military assistance to Turkey has been significant since the relationship between the two nations was established (see Tables 5-3 and 5-4). Its format, however, changed. Like most of the U.S. military assistance in the 1950's and early 1960's, we began with large amount of grant

TABLE 5-3
U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, FMS, Commercial and Basic MAP
(dollars in thousands)

Year	FMS Agreements	FMS Deliveries	FMS Financing Direct	FMS Financing Guaranty	Commercial Exports	MAP Program	MAP Deliveries
50	-	-	-	-	-	103,311	1,020
51	-	-	-	-	-	149,642	43,060
52	-	-	-	-	-	186,336	99,068
53	10	10	-	-	-	154,590	147,322
54	-	-	-	-	-	333,250	232,963
55	4	4	-	-	-	13,899	155,265
56	14	-	-	-	-	183,682	188,745
57	12	-	-	-	-	83,571	150,333
58	13	30	-	-	-	144,763	245,717
59	3	3	-	-	-	184,110	193,129
60	47	51	-	-	-	107,926	88,926
61	97	6	-	-	-	134,003	78,840
62	12	75	-	-	-	167,104	137,903
63	28	49	-	-	-	169,976	161,912
64	182	32	-	-	-	107,755	97,373
65	129	1	-	-	-	91,455	113,134
66	804	460	-	-	-	107,549	94,559
67	946	249	-	-	-	127,195	115,159
68	139	228	-	-	-	88,793	116,577
69	2,096	390	-	-	-	95,657	105,742
70	2,578	3,287	-	-	-	86,226	111,223
71	1,140	130	-	-	3,077	95,952	88,142
72	5,049	1,052	14,971	-	1,925	58,569	95,643
73	211,812	7,621	20,000	-	1,063	63,129	69,512
74	26,393	16,985	45,000	30,000	3,302	78,210	65,884
75	77,519	89,971	40,000	35,000	1,569	13,184	53,419
76	119,351	106,703	-	125,000	10,081	-	-
77	123,712	35,011	-	125,000	13,970	-	-
78	167,595	158,717	-	175,000	9,077	91	6,432
79	169,695	129,935	-	175,000	993	5,830	16,695
80	71,458	137,075	-	202,900	1,127	3,969	35,113
Total	980,839	688,074	119,971	867,900	46,183	3,139,907	3,108,811
81	200,000 ¹	n.a.	n.a.	250,000	n.a.	-	n.a.
82	300,000 ²	n.a.	250,000	150,000	n.a.	630	n.a.

¹Estimated

²Proposed

SOURCES: (37; 35:252-255)

TABLE 5-4
U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, MAP
(dollars in thousands)

Year	Excess MAP Program	Excess MAP Acquisition Cost	IMET MAP Program	IMET MAP Deliveries	Students Trained
50	13,302	-	689	-	-
51	6,427	19,729	758	1,338	-
52	1,632	1,632	1,564	1,636	561
53	9,415	7,066	5,010	4,499	849
54	3,140	2,573	5,350	5,222	985
55	1,310	2,384	6,201	6,277	1,185
56	3,320	1,826	4,218	2,546	480
57	2,221	1,528	6,081	2,030	383
58	5,556	4,949	5,268	3,677	694
59	16,008	14,810	7,536	3,206	605
60	10,345	13,200	7,893	3,693	697
61	14,257	10,038	7,886	7,056	1,332
62	6,905	4,949	7,457	9,224	3,481
63	5,807	7,877	6,114	8,786	1,951
64	7,967	6,090	5,556	5,735	600
65	51,100	12,644	4,287	9,021	1,064
66	36,168	38,798	5,546	5,808	663
67	40,440	77,181	4,154	7,940	470
68	79,183	40,175	4,283	5,976	653
69	80,225	83,061	3,009	3,065	403
70	88,446	100,942	2,927	4,962	596
71	105,610	76,475	2,713	2,594	667
72	104,766	66,950	2,053	2,061	208
73	120,781	103,588	1,725	1,545	253
74	37,888	110,905	2,492	2,253	268
75	7,080	27,156	378	430	102
76	-	-	-	-	-
77	-	-	-	-	-
78	-	-	-	-	-
79	-	237	327	376	86
80	-	12,491	1,370	1,552	160
Total	859,301	849,254	112,845	112,599	19,396
81 ¹	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
82 ²	n.a.	n.a.	3,500	n.a.	n.a.

¹Estimated
²Proposed

SOURCES: (37; 35:252-255)

aid. As the emphasis shifted from grants to foreign military sales (FMS) in the late 60's, so the assistance to Turkey changed. Nevertheless, the total amount of assistance (FMS agreements plus grant aid) remained high. It is important to note that this was true even during the embargo period, even though the military assistance program (MAP) was not providing any material or services during the embargo. This raises the question of how serious the shortage of U.S. spare parts and supplies really was during the embargo years. This question cannot be answered with the data available for this research.

For many years during the period of this relationship, the total U.S. annual military assistance to Turkey (FMS agreements and MAP) has been in excess of \$100 million. The highest year prior to 1982 was 1973, when FMS agreements and MAP amounted to almost \$275 million. The proposed budget for 1982 calls for \$400 million in direct and guaranty financing (35:254).

Domestic Production

In the 1960's the Turks found that modern arms were available to them if they were willing to pay the price. The price was dependence, in the case of the U.S. In other cases their cost was simply funding to purchase arms. The embargo had forced them away from U.S. dependence to using their own funds. However, this price became increasingly more difficult to meet as the Turkish balance of payments worsened. Grants were still available, but these often consisted of equipment being phased out of other NATO inventories. If Turkey wanted

to modernize its military forces, it had to have newer equipment on a more extensive and reliable basis than that provided by grants.

The embargo brought this issue to a head. It impressed on the Turks that they could no longer depend almost exclusively on other nations, even the United States, for military equipment. The development of domestic production capability provided them with one recourse that could help both to maintain their own military structure and to bolster their economic status.

In November 1978, shortly after the embargo was lifted, Turkey had expressed an interest in U.S. assistance in upgrading their defense industry. Seven areas were identified, and a Defense Production Assistance Program (DPA) was established in 1979. The U.S. sent technical teams to Turkey that same year to address the areas. These included:

1. Anti-armor ammunition production
2. Modern fuse manufacture
3. Rocket production
4. Explosives and powder manufacture
5. M-48 tank upgrade
6. Aircraft and engine overhaul and maintenance
7. Shipyard overhaul and new ship (frigate) construction

The teams were charged with determining what the Turkish capabilities and shortfalls were. They were to identify what was needed in terms of data or technical assistance,

or in some cases, plant and equipment. The primary emphasis for these initial teams was in the first five areas, which were Army-related.

These teams found that the Turks had the basic capability to manufacture and overhaul certain defense equipments. What they lacked was the technical data, components, and manufacturing equipment to expand into new production.

Where the teams could identify specific plant equipment that was needed, they came back to the U.S. and surveyed U.S. equipment that was set aside for mobilization purposes. About \$30 million worth of this equipment was offered to Turkey in 1979 on a "no-cost" basis. This is the same status used to provide the equipment to U.S. firms, and basically means that the only costs to the receiver are for packaging, crating, handling and transportation. The equipment, which was expected to have a life-span of 10-30 years, would provide a substitute for capital investment.

No new funds were made available to the Turks from U.S. resources to cover these costs. Instead, current FMS credits had to be allocated for them. Money spent in this way meant that it was not available for immediate acquisition of hardware. Short-term gains of equipment had to be traded to develop capabilities to produce equipment in the long term.

In spite of this, Turkey is putting at least 10 percent of their FY 1981 U.S. FMS credits into these longer term areas. The U.S. goal is to get them closer to 20 percent. Since the U.S. aid is anticipated to increase substantially

in 1982, this will be a significant amount (109).

As optimistic as this program sounds, it does have some flaws. In the process of inspecting this equipment prior to accepting it for shipment, the Turks found that much of it had deteriorated while it was in storage and was useless. Only about one-fifth, or \$6 million, was accepted.

A second problem involved the length of time required to formalize the lease and arrange for the allocation of funds to this program. Although the equipment was "accepted" in March 1980, the final arrangements were not made until March 1981 (109).

Turkey has also had a desire to produce aircraft, tanks and other armored vehicles. A single factory was provided at Eskisehir, prior to the Cyprus crisis, but neither the capital nor the technical expertise required to produce aircraft were available. The plant was used to produce some parts for some jet aircraft during the embargo. Although negotiations have taken place in an effort to induce American, French, or British firms to produce aircraft in Turkey, they have not been able to overcome the financial obstacles. It is estimated that this production effort would require \$2.8 billion spread over ten years (13:257; 91:13).

By 1979 Turkey was producing some defense electronics equipment, Cobra anti-tank missiles, small arms, ammunition, and small numbers of anti-aircraft artillery weapons. The Gölcük Navy Yard was building the first two submarines ever produced in Turkey, with assistance received from West Germany.

The Taskizak Yard in Istanbul was capable of building fast-attack craft, large patrol boats, and landing craft for the Turkish Navy (13:257; 46:8). Turkish capability to produce small naval craft was recognized in a military cooperation agreement signed with Libya in late 1979. Libya agreed to increase exports of crude oil to Turkey and to reschedule oil debts; Turkey would produce and sell patrol gunboats, naval landing craft, and ammunition for Libya and train Libyans at Turkish military training centers. The value of the arrangement for Turkey was about \$400 million (13:281).

Events Leading to a New
Defense Agreement

When the embargo was lifted, Prime Minister Ecevit had called for a new defense agreement to be negotiated between the U.S. and Turkey within a year. Many factors came into play as the negotiations took place.

Early in 1979 the government of the Shah of Iran was overthrown by revolutionary forces hostile to the United States. Critical American intelligence sites used to monitor the Soviet Tyura Tam launch sites were forced to close (66:8). At the same time negotiations were taking place on the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II). The Iranian sites had been expected to provide certain technical data crucial to verification of Soviet compliance with the Treaty. Americans turned to the Turkish sites at Diyarbakir and Sinop to provide crucial coverage in this area. At the same time, Turkey reportedly turned down a U.S. request to allow U.S. helicopters

to use bases in Turkey for assisting in the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Iran.

This period also saw the demise of the CENTO Pact as Iran, Pakistan, and then Turkey withdrew. Although military cooperation within the scope of CENTO had been limited, its dissolution in March 1979 left Turkey as the only northern Middle East nation with any form of security arrangement with the U.S. or the West (54:18).

In May 1979 the U.S. Congress was considering an additional \$150 million in foreign aid for Turkey. Because of Turkey's severe economic problems, the President had requested \$50 million of this aid be provided as a grant. The measure encountered difficulty, however, because some congressmen wished to tie this aid to progress in resolving the Cyprus stalemate (81:3).

As Congress was debating the issue, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit replied to an American request to allow U-2 flights over Turkey. These flights, the U.S. claimed, were necessary to aid in verification of the SALT II Treaty. Ecevit agreed to allow the flights as long as the Soviet Union did not object (79:A-1). The Soviets were pleased with this response and encouraged Turkey to turn down the American request outright (70:6).

Turkey denied that there was any tie between the U-2 turndown and the \$50 million grant. They pointed out that they had "agreed to a modernization of the big U.S. listening post at Sinop on the Black Sea with no fanfare or bargaining

considerations [65:62]."

As the October 9 deadline for the negotiation of a new defense agreement arrived, Turkey announced intentions to allow the bases to remain open until January 9 while negotiations continued (98:11). Before that deadline arrived, another factor would reinforce the value of the intelligence posts in Turkey.

Beginning in late December 1979, the Russians began to deploy large numbers of troops to Afghanistan. This created new pressures to support Turkey (80:8). Turkey was essential not only for intelligence gathering, but to provide stability in an area convulsing from revolution in Iran, invasion in Afghanistan, and the ever-present threat of conflict between other Middle Eastern neighbors.

Turkey continued to allow the U.S. bases to operate and extended the deadline for the agreement negotiations to March 13. On March 29, 1980 the two nations signed the Agreement for Cooperation on Defense and Economy (34). The more popular term is Defense-Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA).

This executive agreement avoided the Congressional pitfalls which had caused so much trouble in the past. Because it contained no multi-year funding requirements, it did not require Congressional approval.

The U.S. pledged to provide defense support (defense materials, service, and training), as well as military assistance in support of Turkey's efforts to modernize its armed

forces. Cooperation in the development and maintenance of Turkey's industrial and technological capability to produce defense materials was emphasized. The seven areas of Defense Industrial Cooperation which the U.S. and Turkey had been previously discussing were included. The DECA also specifically outlined the installations where the U.S. would be allowed to maintain forces, and the activities they would be allowed to carry out. In general the agreement was characterized by the following:

- 1) It is a five-year agreement, renewable annually thereafter.
- 2) It is a bilateral implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.
- 3) It is an executive agreement containing no pledge of specific economic or military assistance.
- 4) It has a broad focus covering cooperation in the interrelated economic, military and defense production areas.
- 5) It provides for the continuation of U.S. military activities in Turkey [41:31].

A major difference between this document and previous ones concerning defense was the recognition of the interrelationship between the economy and defense.

A Joint Turkish-U.S. Defense Support Commission was established by the agreement to assist Turkey in making the best use of defense support available from the U.S. Co-directed by two general officers, one from each country, the commission was charged with developing plans to implement a "Rolling Five-Year Procurement Program" (34:Supl, ART IV). They are to consider the prices, availability, and all possible sources

for equipment identified by Turkey as necessary to accomplish its assigned NATO missions. An annual acquisition program would also be developed, based on the Five-Year Program and Turkish fiscal planning data.

The Military-Economic Tie

By the late 1970's the Turkish economy had reached a point near collapse. There were international concerns over the effect this condition would have on the democratic structure of the nation and its ability to fulfill its NATO commitments. Turkish expenditures for the military fell six percent, to 15 percent of the GNP, as funds were diverted to economic support (see Table 5-2). Several nations responded to this need with economic assistance programs. In 1980 \$3 billion in multi-national loans were provided to Turkey. In June 1980 the International Monetary Fund approved the largest loan in its history, \$1.6 billion for three years for Turkey. These efforts made Turkey the largest recipient of foreign assistance in the world (71:IV,1). At the same time, the nation's rate of inflation soared to 100 percent per year (107:1).

U.S. military assistance was heavily influenced by the state of the economy. The DPA program, the attempt to provide the \$50 million grant, and negotiation of the DECA all clearly supported the effort to build the economy and the defense structure without putting large amounts of additional debt on the nation. In October 1980 the U.S. agreed to postpone until June 1981 payments on \$350 million owed by Turkey.

Turkey was given a five-year grace period, after which it has ten years to pay these debts. American officials indicated that these debts would likely be postponed again (103:5).

There is also a shift away from FMS credit financing through the Federal Financing Bank (FFB). This money was being made available at commercial market rates of up to 12-14 percent. It made no sense to aggravate the debt burden of nations like Turkey by placing this kind of debt on them, especially when the U.S. was forced to keep rescheduling their debt.

Because of this type of problem, the Carter Administration began planning to put direct credit assistance into the budget. Direct credits require full appropriation by Congress. They are provided to nations at rates as low as three percent. Out of the \$400 million in FMS credits requested for Turkey in the 1982 budget proposed by President Reagan, \$250 million is projected as direct credit. The total security assistance package requested for Turkey is \$703.5 million (35:256). This makes them the third largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the world, behind Israel and Egypt (108).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Prior to this point in the thesis, the authors' prime concern has been to compile relevant data concerning the military relationship between the United States and Turkey. Now this data will be used to draw conclusions, and to make recommendations concerning this relationship. It must be stressed that this analysis represents the opinions and evaluations of the authors, and cannot be construed to represent the policies or philosophies of the government of the United States or its agencies.

Conclusions

The conclusions of the study will be presented by answering each of the research questions posed by the authors in Chapter I. The supplementary research questions will be addressed first, to provide a basis for replying to the basic research question.

Research Question 1. What factors cause Turkey to be of military importance to the United States?

The current relationship between the two nations is built on the foundation of mistrust of the intentions of the Soviet Union. As members of NATO, both nations are united for the purpose of deterring any aggression from the Soviets. The

U.S. looks to Turkey, with her large military force and contiguous border with the Soviets, as an additional means to distract Soviet military strength and compound Soviet military planning. Turkey has looked to the United States as the provider of many of the military resources necessary to accomplish this task. Turkey also monitors and controls access to the Black Sea, and could potentially stop Soviet ships from leaving or allow NATO ships to enter this important body of water.

Closely tied to the NATO foundation is the critical U.S. need for intelligence concerning Soviet missile and nuclear weapons testing and other military activity. Turkish facilities provide data in this area, at least some of which cannot be obtained elsewhere with current technologies. Turkey may also be looked on as a potential source of stability in the region. In spite of many domestic crises, not the least of which has been a staggering economy, the nation has remained pro-Western. Other nations close to it in the volatile Middle East have fought among themselves and/or expressed strong anti-American sentiments. Although Turkey has severely limited the U.S. capability to use U.S. forces or facilities on its soil for responding to problems elsewhere in the region, it is possible that a strong Turkey could maintain some stability in the region through its own influence and resources.

Research Question 2. How has the United States Security Assistance Program affected Turkey's defense needs?

The United States, by providing Turkey large amounts of grant military aid through the 1950's and 60's, fostered a

strong dependence on U.S.-developed systems. However, many of these U.S.-developed systems provided to Turkey by either the U.S. or other nations were in the process of being phased out of the inventory of the nations providing them.

The U.S. embargo on Turkey affected that nation, but not primarily because it cut off military supplies. A prime impact was psychological, because a trusted friend had turned against them. A second impact was to eliminate the already dwindling U.S. grant aid and FMS direct financing. This forced the Turks to pay on a credit (at commercial interest rates) basis for all military equipment and supplies. Because the nation was encountering economic difficulties, it reduced the financial support available for Turkish programs intended to modernize and renovate the military.

The embargo also encouraged Turkish efforts to become less dependent on U.S. military equipment. Since the embargo was imposed, military equipment has been obtained from various European sources, with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy leading as suppliers. Turkey is also working to develop its domestic capability in defense-related industries. However, the U.S. is still a very key supplier in all areas except naval vessels and new tanks.

Research Question 3. What factors/events over time have affected the military relationship between the United States and Turkey?

The first factor to foster the relationship was the threat of Soviet hostilities against Turkey. Although many

factors have reduced the urgency of this threat, it still exists as a possibility that both nations must consider.

The major factor affecting the relationship since the mid-1960's has been Cyprus, and the possibility of Greek intervention there. As a result of Turkish responses taken to counter Greek Cypriot actions, U.S. political activity forced changes in the military relationship. Although the direct physical effects of these changes were limited, the sociological impact on Turkey was to force them to strive for greater independence from the U.S.

More recently, the U.S. decision to move from grant aid to FMS guaranty financing affected the relationship by placing additional strains on the Turkish economy and helping to force a slowdown of Turkish efforts to modernize its forces. The current trend toward FMS direct financing should help to alleviate some of the financial problems originally created by this policy by decreasing interest rates on borrowed funds.

Research Question 4. What are the pivotal issues today that will determine the future of this relationship?

The authors have concluded, after careful analysis, that there are many factors which could influence the current military relationship between the two nations. However, these are all based on speculations concerning major changes that could occur in either one of the two nations, or in one of Turkey's immediate neighbors. As such, any statement is beyond the scope of this document. Given the current conditions in Turkey and the United States, the military relationship between

the two nations will not undergo any rapid, major changes.

The Overall Research Question. What is the current military relationship between the United States and Turkey?

It is the opinion of these authors that the military relationship between the two nations has been and will remain strong, in spite of the trying situations which have occurred during the last three decades. The major change in this relationship, barring any unforeseen circumstances, will be a gradual shift away from dependence on the U.S. for military equipment. However, even though Turkey will turn more to European nations (especially the Federal Republic of Germany) and development of domestic industry, this change will be gradual over several years. Even though Turkish dependence on U.S. arms may lessen, America will remain as the major weapons supplier for the near future.

Recommendations

The authors' main purpose has been to bring together in one document as much of the unclassified information concerning the development and growth of the military relationship as possible. This included the problems that were encountered during growth, how each nation has modified the relationship, and specific data on the amount of U.S. security assistance provided to Turkey.

As data were gathered, several areas were encountered which were beyond the scope of this study, but which deserve further study.

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
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The question of what kind of military forces a less developed nation should maintain applies to many nations in the world. The domestic capability of that country to man and support a military force should be included in this research.

A second area of interest concerns the Defense Production Assistance Program. U.S. assistance in developing a nation's domestic defense production capability could be an aid to that nation both militarily and economically. The program should be carefully analyzed to determine its benefits and drawbacks, and how it may be used most effectively. This research could include the effect this capability would have on the resupply of allied forces (i.e., NATO) in the event of major confrontations.

APPENDIX A
AID TO TURKEY AGREEMENT,
1947

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey
(signed at Ankara July 12, 1947; entered into force July 12,
1947)

The Government of Turkey having requested the Government of the United States for assistance which will enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy; and

The Congress of the United States, in the Act approved May 22, 1947,¹ having authorized the President of the United States to furnish such assistance to Turkey, on terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries; and

The Government of the United States and the Government of Turkey believing that the furnishing of such assistance will help to achieve the basic objectives of the charter of the United Nations² and by inaugurating an auspicious chapter in their relations will further strengthen the ties of friendship between the American and Turkish peoples;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of Turkey such assistance as the President of the United States may authorize to be provided in accordance with the Act of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any acts amendatory or supplementary thereto. The Government of Turkey will make effective use of any such assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

Article II

The Chief of Mission to Turkey designated by the President of the United States for the purpose will represent the Government of the United States in matters relating to the assistance furnished under this agreement. The Chief of Mission will determine, in consultation with representatives of the Government of Turkey, the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall from time to time be furnished under this agreement, except that the financial terms upon which specified assistance shall be furnished shall be determined from time to time in advance by agreement of the two governments. The Chief

¹Public Law 75, 80th Congress

²Treaty Series 993; 59 Stat. 1031

of Mission will furnish the Government of Turkey such information and technical assistance as may be appropriate to help in achieving the objectives of the assistance furnished under this agreement.

The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission to fulfill freely his functions in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he may request in the way of reports, information and observation concerning the utilization and progress of assistance furnished.

Article III

The Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information concerning the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. To this end, in so far as may be consistent with the security of the two countries:

1. Representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilization of such assistance; and
2. The Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such assistance.

Article IV

Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, service, or information received by the Government of Turkey pursuant to this agreement, the Governments of the United States and Turkey will respectively take after consultation, such measures as the other government may judge necessary for this purpose. The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished.

Article V

The Government of Turkey will not use any part of the proceeds of any loan, credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered pursuant to this agreement for the making of any payment on account of the principal or interest on any loan made to it by any other foreign government.

Article VI

Any or all assistance authorized to be provided pursuant to this agreement will be withdrawn:

1. If requested by the Government of Turkey.
2. If the Security Council of the United Nations finds (with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly of the United Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of assistance by the Government of the United States pursuant to this agreement unnecessary or undesirable; and
3. Under any of the other circumstances specified in section 5 of the aforesaid Act of Congress or if the President of the United States determines that such withdrawal is in the interest of the United States.

Article VII

This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two governments.

Article VIII

This agreement shall be registered with the United Nations. Done in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, at Ankara, this 12th day of July, 1947.

Edwin C. Wilson
For the Government of the United
States

Hasan Saka
For the Government of the Republic
of Turkey

APPENDIX B
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Signed at Washington April 4, 1949; Senate advice and consent to ratification July 21, 1949; ratified by the President of the United States July 25, 1949; ratification of the United States deposited at Washington July 25, 1949; entered into force August 24, 1949; proclaimed by the President of the United States August 24, 1949; supplemented (to include Greece and Turkey) and amended (article 6) by protocol of October 17, 1951; supplemented (to include Federal Republic of Germany) by protocol of October 23, 1954.

63 Stat. 2241; Treaties and Other
International Acts Series 1964

North Atlantic Treaty

The Parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratification of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security

in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Washington, the fourth day of April, 1949.

For the Kingdom of Belgium:	For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:
P.H. Spaak	Jos. Bech
Silvercruys	Hugues Le Gallais
For Canada:	For the Kingdom of the Netherlands:
Lester B. Pearson	Stikker
H.H. Wrong	E.N. van Kleffens
For the Kingdom of Denmark:	For the Kingdom of Norway:
Gustav Rasmussen	Halvard M. Lange
Henrik Kauffmann	Wilhelm Munthe Morgenstierne
For France:	For Portugal:
Schuman	Jose Caeiro da Matta
H. Bonnet	Pedro Theotonio Pereira
For Iceland:	For the United Kingdom of Great
Bjorni Benediktsson	Britain and Northern Ireland:
Thor Thors	Ernest Bevin
For Italy:	Oliver Franks
Sforza	For the United States of America:
Alberto Tarchiani	Dean Acheson

APPENDIX C
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY PROTOCOL:
ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

Accession of Greece and Turkey. Opened for signature at London October 17, 1951; ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America February 7, 1952; ratified by the President of the United States of America February 11, 1952; proclaimed by the President of the United States of America March 4, 1952; entered into force February 15, 1952.

By the President of the United States of America

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey was opened for signature at London on October 17, 1951, and was signed on behalf of the United States of America and the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty:

Whereas the text of the said Protocol, in the English and French languages, is word for word as follows:

The Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949.

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty.

Agree as follows:--

Article I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

Article II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:--

"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack--

(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,

on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Article III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

Article IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey which was opened for signature at London on October 17, 1951, in the English and French languages, the signed original of which is deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America.

In testimony whereof, I, Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the authentication officer of the said Department, at the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-fourth day of October, 1951.

[seal]

Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State.
by M.P. Chauvin,
Authentic Officer, Department
of State.

Whereas the Senate of the United States of America by their resolution of February 7, 1952, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Protocol;

Whereas the said Protocol was duly ratified by the President of the United States of America on February 11, 1952, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate;

Whereas it is provided in Article III of the said Protocol that the Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof;

Whereas the Government of the United States of America received notifications of acceptance from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on December 6, 1951; Canada on January 21, 1952; the Kingdom of Norway on January 24, 1952; Iceland on January 29, 1952; the Kingdom of Denmark on February 2, 1952; the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on February 5, 1952; the Kingdom of the Netherlands on February 7, 1952; Portugal on February 8, 1952; the United States of America on February 11, 1952; the Kingdom of Belgium on February 14, 1952; France on February 14, 1952; and Italy on February 15, 1952;

Whereas, pursuant to the aforesaid provisions of Article III of the said Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on February 15, 1952;

Whereas the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey each became a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty on February 18, 1952, the date on which the Government of each of the aforesaid States deposited its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the said Treaty;

And whereas it is provided in Article II of the said Protocol that Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack--

(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey and the amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty as set forth in Article II of the said Protocol to the end that, on and after February 15, 1952 in respect of the said Protocol and each and every article and clause thereof and on and after February 18, 1952 in respect of the said amendment shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have caused the Seal to the United States of America to be hereunto affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this fourth day of March in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred fifty-two and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred seventy-sixth.

[seal]

Harry S. Truman

By the President:
Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State.

SOURCE: [19:60-62]

APPENDIX D

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
TO PRIME MINISTER ISMET INÖNÜ OF TURKEY

June 5, 1964

[complete text]

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you have postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your Government to present a unilateral decision of such consequence to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that Treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation, and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at the recent meeting of the Ministerial Council of NATO in the Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by

Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the Island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that Island. The United Nations mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would contravene the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the Furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregarding of Turkish interest in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentments in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations

with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has means a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your Government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as Chief of the Government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion, I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

SOURCE: [19:309-313]

APPENDIX E
LETTER FROM TURKISH PRIME MINISTER ISMET
INÖNÜ TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

June 14, 1964

[complete text]

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of candour and friendship in which your message is meant to be written, I will, in my reply, also try to explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.

Mr. President:

Your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations.

It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected.

In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1963 we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other Guaranteeing Powers only to be answered that the United States was not a party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British command was set-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London Conference and of the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the Island against Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to restore order in the Island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you that we might have to

intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However, you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved.

We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations Force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect the Turkish community against the assaults of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the United Nations Forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the Security Council Resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the Force would be set up very shortly, you insisted again that we refrain from intervening. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations Forces to assume their duty.

Dear Mr. President:

The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very outset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary set-ups have all helped only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to back up their ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intention to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order and to put an end to aggressions. You are well aware of the instigative attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State at the Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think I have thus reminded you how many times and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus. I do remember having emphasized to your high level officials our due appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the Alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the Alliance. As you see, we never had the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two Allies, namely Turkey and Greece.

Mr. President,

In your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty, to consult with the other two Guaranteeing Powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them.

The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department.

We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other Guaranteeing Power.

In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.

As you see, Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting continuously and acting jointly with the other two Guaranteeing Powers. This being the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of consulting with the other two Guaranteeing Powers before taking unilateral action.

I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept "Pacta sunt servanda" which is the fundamental rule of international law. This precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterized as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the "American Law Institute," is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally, and by the Greek Cypriots.

Dear Mr. President:

As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three Guaranteeing Powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with this understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The "Gentlemen's

Agreement," signed on February 19, 1959, by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding.

Furthermore, in the source of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964, by the Security Council, the United States delegate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power to annul or amend international treaties.

The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purpose of effecting the partition of the Island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States.

I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements.

In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Mr. President,

Referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces.

I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement. But the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the Alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.

As to the concern you expressed over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war in case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and obligations stipulated in International Agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore, a Turco-Greek as so properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. Our view, in case of such an intervention is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United Kingdom in their

capacity as Guaranteeing Powers. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government's attention on these matters.

The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the U.S.S.R. as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there exists between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort to justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied.

Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the occurrence of aggression. That is why, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary.

In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December, 1963.

As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held three weeks ago at the Hague, it was acknowledged that the Treaties continued to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the Island and the status of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the flagrantly unlawful acts of one of the parties on the Island should in no way mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obligations of Turkey by virtue of these agreements should be ignored. Such an

understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be accepted. I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in a situation that can by no means be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President, you will agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons: Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this Organization and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security Council Resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the said Resolution.

Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and me would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations' operations in the Island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression. The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the Island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations Forces, assuaging Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their crops; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the crops of Turks are at stake and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you, whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events.

The report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations Forces under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.

Dear Mr. President,

Our allies who are in a position to arbitrate in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the Treaties and abrogating the Constitution. Security can be established in the Island only through the proper functioning of an authority above the Government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the December events, the Anglo-American proposals, and finally the United Nations Command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure acceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.

Dear Mr. President,

You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the context of the Cyprus issue, the nature of the Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by Greece indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the sufferings we bear in our rightful cause and irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves.

That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation of the whole [of] Anatolia by the armies of that country.

Dear Mr. President,

As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.

Mr. President,

I thank you for your statements emphasizing the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the Turkish Nation. I shall be happy to come to the United States to talk over the Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security

Council will meet on June the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO, will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioja will have submitted his report to the Secretary General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to go ahead to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th.

It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I am able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.

Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.

Sincerely,

Ismet İnönü

SOURCE: [19:313-324]

APPENDIX F
MAJOR TURKISH AIR FORCE SYSTEMS,
1980

Type and Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory	On Order
Fighter-Bombers and Fighter-Interceptors			
F-4E Phantom	USA	70	22
F-5A/B Freedom Fighter	USA, Libya ¹	66	
F-5E Tiger II	USA	n/a	42
F/TF-104G Starfighter	Canada	26	
F-104S Starfighter	USA, Italy ²		
	Netherlands	30	25
F-100C/D/F Super Sabre	USA	50	
Reconnaissance (armed)			
RF-5A	USA	30	
RF-5B	USA	4	
RF-4E	USA	8	6
RF-84F	USA	6	
Transports			
C-130E Hercules	USA	7	
C-160 Transall	FR Germany	16	
C-47	USA	30	
C-54	USA	3	
Viscount 794	UK	3	
BN-2 Islander	UK	2	
DO-28 liaison	FR Germany	6	
Cessna 421B liaison	USA	3	
Casa C-212	Spain	2	
Helicopters			
UH-19 utility	USA	5	
HH-1H utility	USA	6	
UH-1H Iroquois utility	USA	10	
CH-47 Chinook med. transport	USA	n/a	
Trainers			
T-33A	USA, Netherlands		
	Canada, FR Germany	40	
T-34 Mentor	Canada	20	
T-37	Canada, USA	40	20
T-38 Talon	USA	27	3
T-41	USA	30	
G-91	FR Germany	n/a	12
F-100 C/F	USA	50	
Missiles			
Nike Ajax SAM	USA	75	
Nike Hercules SAM	USA	75	
Sidewinder AAM	USA	600	360
Sparrow AAM	USA	537	3
Falcon AAM	USA	n/a	
AS.12 ASM	France	n/a	
Bullpup ASM	USA, Europe ³	300	
Maverick	USA	99	1

¹Transferred as gift from Libya in September 1975.

²First shipment of eighteen purchased with loan from Libya.

³Built by West European consortium under license from U.S.

SOURCES: (9:30,104; 10:31-32,95,102; 13:316-17; 15:126-30
16:285-86; 17:200-03; 39; 40)

APPENDIX G
MAJOR TURKISH NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS,
1980

Type and Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory	On Order
Submarines			
Type 209 (8 torpedo tubes), built in 1974	FR Germany	3	1 ¹
Guppy-class (10 torpedo tubes) built in 1940's	USA	10	2
Destroyers			
Gearing-class, built in 1940s	USA	5	
Fletcher-class, built in 1940s	USA	5	
Sumner-class, built in 1940s	USA	1	
R.H.Smith-class, built in 1940s	USA	1	
unknown			1
Frigates			
Berk-class, built in 1971-72	Turkey ²	2	
Raven-class, built in 1940s	USA, UK	6 ³	
Bathurst-class, built in 1940s	Australia	2 ⁴	
Coastal Escorts			
PC-class, built during WWII	USA, Turkey	6 ⁵	
Patrol boats and Small Craft			
Fast patrol boats similar to Jaguar III-class, equipped with Harpoon or Penguin SSMs and 2 torpedo tubes	Turkey ⁶ FR Germany	19	4
Coastal patrol boats, armed for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) action	USA, Turkey FR Germany	28	
Minelayers			
Falster-class	Denmark	1	
Converted LSM-class for coastal use	USA	5	
Converted LST-class for coastal use	USA, FR Germany	2	
YMP-class for coastal use	USA	1	
Minesweepers			
MSC-class for coastal use	USA	12	
MSI-class for inshore use	USA	4	
MCB-class for coastal use	Canada	4	
French Mercure-class	FR Germany	5	
Amphibious Vessels			
Landing ships, tank (LST)	USA	4	
Landing craft, tank (LCT)	Turkey	34	
Landing craft	Turkey	16	
Landing craft, medium (LCM)	Turkey	20	
Submarine Tenders	Turkey	2	
Other Repair Vessels	USA, FR Germany	4	

Type and Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory	On Order
Aircraft			
Agusta-Bell AB-204B ASW helicopter	Italy	3	
Agusta-Bell AB-212 ASW helicopter	Italy	6	10
Grumman S-2A Tracker, twin-engine ASW search plane	USA	20	23
Grumman TS-2A trainer version	USA	2	
Missiles			
Harpoon SSM to equip fast patrol boats	USA	37	14
Penguin SSM to equip fast patrol boats	Norway	n/a	n/a
MM-8 Exocet SSM to equip fast patrol boats	France	n/a	n/a
n/a -- not available			
¹ Being built in Turkey with West German aid			
² Built at Gölcük shipyard			
³ One is used as command ship for fast patrol boats, one as a minesweeper, two as hydrographic vessels, one for logistic purposes, and one as a training ship			
⁴ Used as support vessels for minesweepers			
⁵ One transferred from United States Navy; five built by Turkey at Gölcük shipyard in mid-1960s.			
⁶ Built at Taskizak shipyard under license from West Germany			

SOURCE: (9:30,104; 10:31-32,95,102; 13:317-18; 15:126-30; 16:285-86; 17:200-03; 39; 40)

APPENDIX H
MAJOR TURKISH ARMY WEAPONS, 1980

Type and Description	Country of Origin	In Inventory	On Order
Tanks			
Leopard II	FR Germany	n/a	193
M-47, M-48	USA, FR Germany	3,500	
Armored Personnel Carriers			
M-113, M-59 Commando	USA, Italy	2,000	
M-107, M-109, M-110	USA	n/a	n/a
Self-Propelled Guns			
105mm	USA, UK	400	
155mm	USA	210	
175mm	USA	36	
Howitzers (including self-propelled)			
75mm, 105mm, 155mm, 203mm	USA, UK, Italy		
	FR Germany	1,500	
Mortars			
60mm, 81mm, 4.2-inch	USA, Italy		
	FR Germany	1,750	
Antiaircraft Guns			
40mm	USA, Sweden	900	
Recoilless Rifles			
57mm	USA	1,200	
75mm	USA	390	
106mm	USA	800	8
Missiles			
Honest John SSM	USA	18-24	
Cobra 2000 antitank missile	FR Germany ¹	300-800	
TOW antitank missile	USA	n/a	n/a
Milan anti-tank missile	France	n/a	6,520
Liaison Aircraft			
DHC-2	Canada	2	
Cessna U-17 Skywagon monoplane	USA	18	
Cessna 206	USA	6	
Cessna 421	USA	3	
DO-27 light transport	FR Germany	7	
DO-28 light transport	FR Germany	9	
Beech T-42 Baron	USA	5	
Champion Citabria 1505 training aircraft	USA	40	
Helicopters			
Agusta-Bell 205/206 utility	USA, Italy	100	
Bell 47G utility	USA	20	
Dornier-Bell UH-1D utility	USA		
	FR Germany	48	
n/a -- not available			
¹ Some purchased in 1976 for delivery beginning in 1977; others being built in Turkey under license from West Germany			

SOURCE: (9:30,104; 10:31-32,95,102; 13:315; 15:126-30; 16:286-86; 17:200-03; 39; 40)

APPENDIX I
ARMS SUPPLIED TO TURKEY

Symbols and acronyms used in this appendix are defined below:

- ... Information not available
- () A greater degree of uncertainty about the date of delivery or number of items delivered
- 1969- 1969 and subsequent years
- AAM Air-to-air missile
- AGM Air-to-ground missile
- APC Armored personnel carried
- ARV Armored recovery vehicle
- ASM Air-to-surface missile
- ASW Anti-submarine warfare
- ATM Anti-tank missile
- MBT Main battle tank
- SAM Surface-to-air missile
- SPH Self-propelled Howitzer
- SSM Surface-to-surface missile

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
		AIRCRAFT		
(1951)	36	Lockheed T-33 A-N	USA	
1952	24	Beech T-34 Mentor	Canada	MAP
1952-53	(130)	Republic F-84F	USA	
(1953)	(8)	Beech C-45	USA	
1954-56	82	Canadair CL 13 Sabre		
		MK 2 and MK 4	Canada	
(1956)	3	Douglas C-54	USA	
(1956)	(30)	Republic RF-84F	USA	
1956-57	25	Canadair CL-13 Sabre		
		MK 4	UK	
(1957-59)	200	Piper L-18 Super Cub	USA	
1958	260	NA F-100C Super Sabre	USA	MAP
(1958)	(30)	Lockheed RT-33A	USA	
(1959)	50	NA F-86D Sabre	USA	MAP

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
(1960)	(25)	NA F-100F Super Saber	USA	
(1961)	23	Cessna T-37	USA	Might be from Canada
1962-63	(65)	NA F-86K Sabre	Netherlands	Overhauled by Fiat in Italy
1963	38	Canadair F-104G Starfighter	Canada	MAP offshore procurement
1964	5	Lockheed C-130E Hercules	USA	
1964	42	Republic F-84F	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
1965	40	Northrop F-5 Free- dom Fighter	USA	
1965	5	Lockheed C-130E Hercules	USA	
1966	18	Cessna U-17A	USA	
1966	15	Dornier Do-27	FR Germany	NATO aid
1966	5	Dornier Do-28 B-1	FR Germany	NATO aid
1966	(20)	Agusta-Bell 47	Italy	
1966	13	Agusta-Bell 204B	Italy	
1966-68	75	Northrop F-5 Free- dom Fighter	USA	
1967	42	Republic F-84F	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
(1967)	7	Agusta-Bell 204B	Italy	
(1967)	8	Grumman S-2 Tracker	Netherlands	
1967-68	(5)	Bell 47G	USA	
1968	3	Dornier Do-27	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
1968	18	Lockheed T-33	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
1968-69	36	Convair F-102A Delta Dagger	USA	MAP
1968-69	3	Convair TF-102	USA	
1968-69	(35)	Agusta-Bell 206A Jet Ranger	Italy	For Army
1969	40	NA F-100C Super Sabre	USA	
1969	15	Siat 223 Flamingo	FR Germany/ built in Spain	
(1969)	25	Northrop F-5 Free- dom Fighter	USA	
1971	5	Beech T-42 Baron	USA	MAP
1971	12	Lockheed T-33	FR Germany	Ex-Luftwaffe
1971	2	Dornier Do-28	FR Germany	
1971-72	12	Grumman S-2 Tracker	USA	
1971-72	2	Grumman TS-2	USA	
1971-72	20	Transall C-160	FR Germany	

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1972	19	Cessna T-41	USA	MAP
1972	3	Agusta-Bell 205 Iroquois	USA	
1972	9	Lockheed T-33	USA, Netherlands, Canada	NATO aid
1972	(5)	Republic RF-84F	France	
1972	7	Lockheed F-104 Starfighter	Spain	
(1972)	4	Cessna 206	USA	For Army
(1972)	2	Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander	UK	
1974-76	40	F-104S Starfighter	Italy, USA	
(1973-77)	40	F-4E Phantom	USA	
(1977-78)	15	F-100	USA	
1977-78	56	AB 205 A-1 Helicopter	Italy, USA	
1977-78	6	AB 212 AS ASW Helicopter	Italy, USA	
1978	20	F-104G Starfighter	FR Germany	MAP
1978	2	Bell 205 UH-1H Helicopter	USA	
1977-78	32	F-4E Phantom	USA	Direct purchase to circumvent embargo on MAP
1979	40	Citabria 150 H.9C	USA	
(1978-80)	9	RF-4E Phantom	USA	
1979-80	3	S-2 Anti-submarine	USA	
1980	27	T-38 Talon	USA	
MISSILES				
(1955)	75	Western Electric Nike Ajax	USA	
(1958)	(600)	NWC Sidewinder	USA	
(1959)	(75)	Western Electric Nike Hercules	USA	
(1960)	(24)	Unamicon MGR-1 Honest John	USA	
1964	(300)	MBB B0 810 Cobra 200	FR Germany	
(1966)	300	Martin Bullpup	USA, Europe	Built under license in European consortium
(1967-73)	(500)	MBB B0 810 Cobra 2000	Turkey, FR Germany	
(1968)	(100)	Nord SS.11	France	
(1975)	--	Penguin naval SSM	Norway	
1976-	200	AIM 7-E Sparrow AAM	Italy, USA	

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1977-	6,520	Milan ATM	FR Germany, France	
1977-	--	AGM 65-A Maverick	USA	
(1978-)	--	TOW ATM	USA	
1978	33	Harpoon SSM	USA	
1977-78	(720)	AIM 7 Sparrow AAM	USA	
n/a	258	AIM 7 Sparrow AAM	USA	
n/a	400	Sidewinder AAM	USA	
NAVAL VESSELS				
1950	2	Submarine "Gur" class	USA	Launched 1943-45
1950	1	Submarine rescue ship	USA	Launched 1946 adapted 1947
1952	5	Coastal minelayer	USA	Launched 1945 as LSM; converted 1952; NATO aid
1952	1	Repair ship	USA	Launched 1944
1953	4	Motor launch	USA	ex-US
1954	2	Submarine "Gur" class	USA	Launched 1943-45; on loan
1957	4	Destroyer, "Milne" Class	UK	Completed 1941-42; re-fitted 1959
1957	9	Coastal escort, "Batia" class	Canada	Completed 1941-42; ex-Bangor class
1958	1	Submarine "Gur" class	USA	Launched 1943-45
1958	1	Coastal Minelayer	USA	Completed 1958; MAP
1958	4	Coastal Minesweeper	Canada	
1958-59	4	Coastal Minesweeper	USA	
1959-60	2	Torpedo boat, "Nasty" class	FR Germany	Completed 1959-60; war reparations
1960	2	Submarine "Gur" class	USA	Launched 1943-45
1960-61	9	Motor launch	FR Germany	Built 1960-61
1961	1	Boom defense vessel	USA	Launched 1960; procured by US from FR Ger.
1964	3	Patrol boat "Akhisar" class	USA	
1964	1	Boom defense vessel	France	Built 1938

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1965	2	Patrol boat, "Akhisar" class	USA	
1965	4	Coastal minesweeper	USA	
1966-67	6	Motor Torpedo boat "Jaguar" class	FR Germany	Built 1966-67; NATO aid
1967	2	Destroyer "Fletcher" class	USA	Launched 1943
1967	1	Coastal minesweeper	USA	
1967	2	Inshore minesweeper	USA	
(1968)	1	Motor torpedo boat "Jaguar" class	FR Germany	NATO aid
1969	3	Destroyer "Fletcher" class	USA	Completed 1943-44
1969	1	Submarine depot ship	USA	Completed 1944
(1969)	2	Torpedo boat "Nasty" class	FR Germany	NATO aid
1970	1	Boom defense vessel	USA	Completed 1952; ex-Dutch
1970	3	Coastal minesweeper "MSC" type	(USA)	ex-French ex-British
1970-71	4	Submarine "Guppy II A" type	USA	Completed 1944
1971	2	Destroyer "Gearing" class	USA	Completed 1945-46; modernized
1971-72	7	Gunboat	USA	New
1972	1	Submarine "Guppy II A" type	USA	Completed 1944;
1972	1	Submarine "Guppy I A" type	USA	Completed 1944 modernized 1951
1972	1	Destroyer "Gearing" class	USA	Commissioned 1947
1972	2	Destroyer "Allen M. Sumner" class	USA	Completed 1944-45; 1 modernized early 1960s; 1 in 1972
1972	1	Fleet ocean tug	USA	Launched 1942; FY1973 ship lease
1972	1	Barracks craft	USA	Completed 1944-45; FY1973 ship lease
1972	1	Supply ship	FR Germany	

Delivery Date	Number	Item	Supplier	Comment
1972	1	Minelayer	FR Germany	Former US landing ship
1973	2	Fast patrol boat "Ashville 1968" class	USA	Commissioned 1969
1975-76	7	"Jaguar" fast attack torpedo boat	FR Germany	Completed (1962)
1975-76	5	"Vegasack" coastal minesweeper	FR Germany	Completed 1960
1976	1	"Lürssen" fast missile boat	FR Germany	3 more being license-produced in Turkey
1977-78	2	Type 209 submarine	FR Germany	2 more being license-produced in Turkey
ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES				
(1950)	(25)	M-36 tank destroyer	USA	
(1952)	(100)	M-26 Pershing MBT	USA	
(1950-52)	(50)	M-24 Chaffee lt. tank	USA	
(1955-58)	(540)	M-47 Patton MBT	USA	
(1957-58)	(100)	M-41 Walker Bulldog	USA	
(1957-58)	(400)	M-59 APC	USA	
(1961-64)	(140)	M-48 Patton med tank	USA	
(1963)	(100)	M-113 APC	USA	
1964	481	M-113 APC	Italy	
1968-70	(24)	M-44 and M-52 SPH	FR Germany	NATO aid
1969-70	69	M-74 ARV	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
(1969-70)	79	M-48 Patton med tank	FR Germany	NATO aid; surplus
1972-73	250	M-48 Patton med tank	USA	MAP
1977-	--	M-113 APC	USA	

SOURCE: (7:26,89; 8:27-28,96; 9:30,104; 10:31-32,95,102; 15:126-30; 16:285-86; 17:200-03; 38; 39; 40; 45:1-12; 46:1-14)

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